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| Trump, Azar and Redfield. |
With a majority of states now "reopening" their economies, millions of Americans remain unemployed or furloughed and it is unclear when the economy will full recover - some analysts point to late 2021. In this state, the question becomes why was the United States so ill prepared and why was the national response bungled so badly? A very long piece in
Rolling Stone looks at the disastrous federal response and names four individuals as ultimately to blame, starting with Donald Trump who has always treated the pandemic as a PR and political issue rather than a public health emergency. While Trump set the tone, the disaster was compounded by his appointees who were picked based on ideology and/or ties to far right Christians rather than for the true expertise and competence. In making these flawed appointments, Trump was following both GOP ideology and pandering to leading Christofascists. The results have proven deadly for tens of thousands of Americans. Here are highlights from the article which is an indictment of Trump and ultimately the GOP "small government" agenda and obsession with funding cuts to finance tax cuts for the very wealthy (read the entire piece):
Dr. Robert Redfield, the director
of the Centers for Disease Control, flanked Donald Trump at the
podium in the White House
briefing room. It was February 29th, the day of the first reported U.S. death
from the coronavirus,
and [Trump] the president fielded an urgent question: “How should Americans prepare for
this virus?” a reporter asked. “Should they go on with their daily lives?
Change their routine? What should they do?”
A tall man, with a tan, freckled head, and a
snow-white chinstrap beard, Redfield stepped to the podium. “The risk at this
time is low,” Redfield told the country. “The American public needs to go on
with their normal lives.”
This reassurance came at precisely, and
tragically, the wrong time. With a different answer, much of the human
devastation that was about to unfold in the United States would have been
avoidable. Academic research from Imperial College in London, modeling the U.S.
response, estimates that up to 90 percent of COVID-19 deaths could have
been prevented had the U.S. moved to shut down by March 2nd. Instead,
administration leaders dragged their feet for another two weeks, as the virus
continued a silent, exponential assault. By early May, more than 75,000
Americans were dead.
Even as he spoke, Redfield knew the country
should be taking a different course. The Coronavirus Task Force had resolved to
present the president with a plan for mitigation efforts, like school and
business closures, on February 24th, but reportedly reversed course after Trump
exploded about the economic fallout. Instead, the CDC director continued
touting “aggressive containment” to Congress on February 27th.
Experts tell Rolling
Stone that ship had sailed when the virus made the leap from infected
travelers into the general public. “If you’ve got a community spreading respiratory
virus, it’s not going to be containable,” says Dr. Amesh Adalja, a senior
scholar at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Health Security. “You have
to shift to mitigation right away.”
Patty Murray is the ranking member of the
Senate’s top health committee, and represents Washington state, the nation’s
first coronavirus hot spot. She blames the administration for a delay that
“overwhelmed the health care system and resulted in tens of thousands of
deaths.” And she singles out Redfield, in particular, for “dereliction of
duty.”
“We had ample notice to
get our country ready,” says Ron Klain, who served as President Obama’s Ebola
czar, and lists the rolling out of testing, securing protective equipment, and
building up hospital capacity as necessary preventative steps. “We spent all of
January and February doing none of those things, and as a result, when this
disease really exploded in March, we weren’t prepared.”
The government leaders
who failed to safeguard the nation are CDC Director Redfield; FDA Commissioner
Stephen Hahn; Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar; and of course,
President Trump. Together, these men had the power to change the direction of
this pandemic, to lessen its impact on the economy, and constrain the death
toll from COVID-19. Each failed, in a series of errors and mismanagement that
grew into a singular catastrophe — or as Jared Kushner described it on Fox
& Friends, “a great success story.”
Precious weeks slipped by — amid infighting, ass
covering, and wasted effort — and the virus slipped through the nation’s
crippled surveillance apparatus, taking root in hot spots across the country,
and in particular, New York City.
The mismanagement cost lives. With adequate
testing from the beginning, says Dr. Howard Forman, a Yale professor of
public-health policy, “we would have been able to stop the spread of this virus
in its tracks the way that many other nations have.” Instead, says Sen.
Murray, the administration’s response was “wait until it’s too late, and then
try and contain one of the most aggressive viruses that we’ve ever seen.”
Blind to the virus’s penetration and unable to
target mitigation where it was needed, the administration and state governors
had to resort to the blunt instrument of shuttering the economy, says Dr.
Ashish Jha, director of the Harvard Global Health Institute. And the lack of
testing kept us in limbo. “Our economy is shut down because we still do not
have adequate testing,” Jha says. “We have been woefully behind from the
beginning of this pandemic.”
If the president’s deputies made trillion-dollar
mistakes, accountability for the pandemic response lies with Trump, who waived
off months of harrowing intelligence briefings, choosing to treat the
coronavirus as a crisis in public relations, rather than a public-health
emergency. Having staked his re-election on a strong economy, Trump downplayed
the virus.
The front-line agency
built to respond to a pandemic, the CDC, was placed in unreliable hands. Dr.
Robert Redfield is a right-wing darling with a checkered scientific past. His
2018 nomination was a triumph for the Christian right, a coup in particular for
evangelical activists Shepherd and Anita Smith, who have been instrumental in
driving a global AIDS strategy centered on abstinence.
Redfield championed
discriminatory policies that he defended as “good medicine” — including
quarantining of HIV-positive soldiers in a segregated barracks. These soldiers
were routinely given dishonorable discharges after superiors rooted out
evidence of homosexuality, and left to suffer the course of their devastating
disease without health insurance.
When his CDC
appointment was announced in March 2018, Sen. Murray warned of Redfield’s “pattern
of ethically and morally questionable behavior,” as well as his “lack of
public-health expertise,” and urged Trump to “reconsider.” But the CDC post
does not require Senate approval. Redfield sought to reassure CDC staff that
his views had modernized, and that he now embraced condoms to slow HIV
infection.
The CDC reports to the
Department of Health and Human Services, led by Alex Azar, a former executive
for the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly who gained infamy, in his five-year
tenure, by doubling the price of insulin.
Azar is a creature of the GOP establishment: He
cut his teeth as a Supreme Court clerk to Antonin Scalia, worked with Brett
Kavanaugh on the Clinton-Whitewater investigation under special counsel Ken
Starr, and served as a deputy HHS administrator in the George W. Bush era,
before becoming Eli Lilly’s top lobbyist.
Azar sought to shrink the CDC, an agency that has
been on the chopping block throughout the Trump administration. In HHS’s most
recent budget proposal — unveiled this past February, 10 days after the World
Health Organization declared a global emergency over the coronavirus — Azar
sought an $85 million cut to the CDC’s Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious
Diseases program and a $25 million cut to Public Health Preparedness and Response.
Azar defended the budget at the time as making “difficult, prudent choices.”
The Trump administration had also hollowed out
the CDC’s China presence, slashing staff from 47 to barely a dozen. These cuts
were part of a broad-reaching drawdown of America’s disease preparedness,
including Trump’s decision to disband the National Security Counsel’s
pandemic-response team.
Stephen Hahn had been on the job
at the FDA for barely a month. A bald, 60-year-old of modest height, Hahn has
an impeccable résumé — he served as chief medical executive at the University
of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center — but he had no experience running a
government agency.
The need to engage the private sector for
coronavirus testing was not only foreseeable, it was foreseen — by Trump’s
first FDA commissioner, Scott Gottlieb. In a January 28th Wall Street
Journal article, “Act Now to Prevent an American Epidemic,” Gottlieb
warned that the “CDC will struggle to keep up with the volume of screening.” He
said the government must begin “working with private industry to develop
easy-to-use, rapid diagnostic tests.”
If Hahn read his predecessor’s call to action, he
did not act on it. . . . . Yet the failure to activate the private sector was
the key difference between the U.S. response to the coronavirus and that of
South Korea, which first detected the virus in its country at the same time the
U.S. did. “Instead of going through regulatory hijinks,” says Milton, the
University of Maryland virologist, South Korea “turned their biomedical
industry loose, and they started producing lots of tests right away.”
The testing breakdown had left the nation blind
to the true scope of the outbreak. By March 1st, the CDC’s official tally of
coronavirus cases had spiked from the 15 cases touted by Trump to 75. But
researchers at Northeastern University have now developed models showing there
were likely 28,000 infections at the time, in just five major cities, including
New York and Seattle.
Having plunged the nation
headlong and unprepared into the deadliest disease outbreak in a century,
President Trump is now proving to be one of the greatest obstacles to an
effective national response.
Sebelius ultimately blames Trump for failing to
end the infighting and fix the testing failure. “The White House has a unique
way to get agencies’ attention, by making it clear that they want a solution,
and everybody at the table with that solution within 24 hours,” she says. “If
the president wants this to happen, it will happen.” But on his visit to the
CDC in Atlanta, Trump had made an extraordinary admission: That he did not want
to let passengers from a cruise ship, then suffering an outbreak off the
California coast, to come on shore because the tally of patients would rise. “I
like the numbers being where they are,” Trump said.
Trump plainly saw effective testing as a threat
to his political messaging that the administration was containing the virus. By
standing at CDC headquarters to declare that the tests were “perfect” and that
he didn’t want COVID-19 numbers going up, the president was doing the exact
opposite of demanding a fix. For the president’s deputies, Sebelius says,
“there couldn’t be a clearer signal.”
In the event that Trump is still president when a
vaccine becomes available, Sebelius argues that the loose confederations that
have formed in the Northeast, Midwest, and Pacific states to coordinate their
reopenings may need to band together in a shadow government to sidestep Trump.
“Maybe governors will put together their own system,” she says, “and ignore
what’s happening in the White House.”
Again, read the entire piece.