Monday, May 04, 2026
Sunday, May 03, 2026
Trump's America: An Empire in Decline
The American-Israeli attack on Iran was more than a bad idea; it has turned into a watershed in the decline of the American empire. Some might prefer the word “hegemony” to describe the world order the United States leads, since its flag does not generally fly over the lands it protects or exploits. But the rules are the same: Imperial systems, whatever you call them, last only as long as their means are adequate to their ends. And with the Iran war, President Trump has overextended the empire dangerously.
A Middle Eastern military misadventure is one of the last ways a casual observer would have expected Mr. Trump’s presidency to go wrong. The problems he alluded to in all three of his presidential campaigns had mostly resulted from our leaders’ governing beyond their means. At home, proponents of wokeness underestimated the costs and difficulties of micromanaging interactions between groups. Abroad, the mighty American armed forces proved to have no particular talent for democracy promotion, and there was the recent debacle in Iraq to prove it.
Mr. Trump, people thought, would be different. For all the grandiosity of the expression “Make America great again,” Trump voters did not expect him to take on new problems. The greatness would be mostly atmospheric — braggadocio, not adventurism. The United States could become greater even if it withdrew to a less expansive sphere of influence. When he proclaimed an updated Monroe Doctrine, refocusing American attention on the Western Hemisphere, retrenchment was what most people thought they were getting.
Britain had to surrender its far-flung system of colonies and protectorates after World War II. . . . . Britain did not try to hold territories it could no longer afford. It wound up on reasonably good terms with its former colonial possessions. Its disengagement was a success, though this can be hard to see because what was being managed was decline. Mr. Trump had a chance of pulling off something similar.
The assumption in Washington over the past decade has been that the world is engaged in a game of geostrategic musical chairs and the music is about to stop. China may soon overmatch us not just in military-industrial capacity but also in information technology. The world will harden into a new, less favorable geostrategic configuration. This is the last moment to reshape it in America’s favor.
The attack on Iran was different. It was not a defensive consolidation; it was the assumption of a dangerous, open-ended responsibility. Yes, it might be better if the mullahs fell. But for the United States, an energy-independent country withdrawing to its own hemisphere, this is not a vital interest. War with Iran was not on the radar screen of anyone in the administration just a few months ago.
That is because the United States lacks the military means to impose its will on Iran in a long conflict. In 1991 a million soldiers from more than 40 countries were needed to reverse the invasion of Kuwait carried out by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, a country less sophisticated than Iran and a fraction of its size. When Iran and Iraq fought each other to a standstill in the 1980s, deaths ran into the hundreds of thousands on each side. The United States would have to send a significant portion of its armed forces — which total only 1.3 million troops — to stand a chance of subduing Iran, and that force, if successful, would have to stay for a long time.
The argument can be made that the United States no longer depends on mustering huge armies: It has sophisticated missiles and other standoff weapons. But those weapons are needed to defend allies and interests in other theaters, and the United States is depleting them. According to reporting in The Times, it has already used 1,100 of its long-range stealth cruise missiles, earmarked for potential conflicts in Asia, leaving just 1,500 in the stockpile, and fired an additional 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, about 10 times as many as the military buys in an average year. American leaders have been scolding their European allies for years about the inadequacy of their fighting forces. But if one measures America’s military might against our pretensions rather than our G.D.P., it is just as inadequate.
It would be wrong to say the United States is trapped in the war it started. It has options. But it is now going to pay a very steep price, no matter which of them it chooses. It can desist in Iran — having demonstrated, for no good reason, that its military is far less dominant than the world had assumed. Or it can draw resources from theaters that are of vital national interest, such as Europe and East Asia, to fund what the president refers to as his Iranian “excursion.” Or it can resort to the extreme military options Mr. Trump darkly alluded to in social media posts starting in early April, which will redound to the everlasting shame of the country he leads. The United States stands to lose its reputation, its friends or its soul.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel urged this war on Mr. Trump . . . . Mr. Trump’s gullibility provided Mr. Netanyahu with a last chance.
It is tempting to ask where in the process of imperial decline the United States now finds itself. It certainly has elements in common with Britain a century ago: deindustrializing, overcommitted, complacent. On the eve of World War I, Britain was dependent on Germany for industrial and even military technology — and unwilling to re-examine the free-trade system on which German supremacy had been built. By the eve of World War II, Britain was essentially bankrupt. There are parallels in America’s dependence on China today.
Saturday, May 02, 2026
In Trump’s America, It Takes a King to Praise Democracy
Two hundred and fifty years into the American experiment, it turns out that it takes a King to tell us how to run our Republic.
On Tuesday, His Majesty King Charles III, the great-great-great-great-great-grandson of George III, the British monarch who lost the Revolutionary War to a bunch of impertinent colonists enamored of Enlightenment ideas about the natural rights of man, spoke to the U.S. Congress. With dry wit and a sense of irony that was surely lost on the host he so subtly trolled, Charles extolled the virtues of American-style liberal democracy now under threat by America’s own leader. What does it say about our current politics that polite British-accented clichés about the benefits of the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and the strengths that flow from “vibrant, diverse, and free societies” could end up sounding downright subversive?
The King’s biggest applause line was a tribute to Magna Carta, the thirteenth-century compact between an English monarch and his restive nobles, which, Charles noted, has become a pillar of American constitutional jurisprudence, with the Supreme Court citing it at least a hundred and sixty times in its history, not least to establish “the principle that executive power is subject to checks and balances.” It was a telling sign of our dysfunctional times that members of Congress from both parties, having been increasingly iced out of decision-making by a President claiming unprecedented executive power for himself, immediately rose for a standing ovation.
Did it matter that Donald Trump did not get the joke?
Even as Charles was speaking, Trump’s White House posted on social media an image of the two men with the caption “TWO KINGS. 👑” Later that evening, during a toast at a state dinner for his royal visitor, Trump praised his “fantastic” speech and lauded Charles for accomplishing what he could not—getting Democrats to stand and applaud him. He seemed utterly oblivious to why they had done so, and remained apparently unaware for the rest of the King’s trip. “He’s a great King,” Trump said on Thursday, at the conclusion of the state visit. “The greatest King, in my book.”
Trump spent the rest of the week proving Charles’s point about unchecked powers, with his Justice Department indicting the former F.B.I. director James Comey, for a social-media post of seashells—which prosecutors improbably claim constituted a threat on the President’s life—and his Federal Communications Commission ordering a review of the broadcast licenses for ABC stations just days after the comedian Jimmy Kimmel had used the network’s airwaves to make a joke that the First Lady did not like.
So here we are, two and a half centuries later, with a King who venerates the American Bill of Rights and a President who, increasingly, rejects it. It hardly seemed a coincidence that, on the same day as the King’s speech, reports emerged about the Trump State Department’s plans to honor America’s two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary with a commemorative passport whose distinguishing feature will be a large likeness of the President. Watching Trump and Charles together this week, I could not help but think of the bizarre contrast between the public modesty of the crowned monarch and the pomposity of the self-styled populist President; of these two, it’s not George III’s heir who is the one planning to erect golden statues of himself in his palaces.
The contrast between Charles and Trump was nowhere clearer than when it came to the King’s vision for America’s continued leadership in the world. In his speech, Charles, like every American President of my lifetime except Trump, hailed NATO as the foundation of our common defense. Then he exhorted Congress to defend “Ukraine and her most courageous people” with the “same unyielding resolve” that the United States has shown in fighting two world wars and other international threats to democracy over the past century. The times, he insisted, demand that America “ignore the clarion calls to become ever more inward-looking.”
These comments, as striking as they were in confirming a major international pivot by the United States, got little attention. They did, however, seem to prompt Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky, to shift his own tactics. . . . . “If the Vice-President is proud that he’s not helping us, it means he’s helping Russians, and I’m not sure that it’s strengthening the United States.”
On Wednesday, Trump spoke on the phone with Putin about the wars in the Middle East and Europe. Although Russia has, according to intelligence officials, been aiding the Iranians with targeting information in their war with the U.S., Trump claimed that Putin would “like to be of help” in resolving the conflict. As for Ukraine, he told reporters that Putin “was ready to make a deal a while ago,” all but publicly blaming Zelensky, once again, for the continuation of the Russian invasion.
Trump, in other words, was privately trash-talking Zelensky in what he himself called another “very good” conversation with his “friend” Putin. He may not have got Zelensky to agree to peace on Russia’s terms, but, in little more than a year, Trump has practically run down a checklist of other Putin priorities: undermining America’s European allies, effectively ending billions of dollars in funding for Ukraine, attempting to shut down Radio Free Europe and other U.S. government agencies that promote democracy in the former Soviet Union, even lying publicly on Putin’s behalf to claim that Ukraine, not Russia, started the war,
Just this week, while Charles praised the NATO alliance to the U.S. Congress as the West’s indispensable bulwark, Trump was threatening to pull troops out of U.S. bases in Germany, apparently because he’s angry about criticism of his war in Iran by the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz.
There is, sadly, no other conclusion to draw from all this than the obvious one: Trump, however personally dazzled he is by the wealth and splendor of the British monarchy, much prefers the policies and the power of the modern-day tsar he spoke with on Wednesday to those of the King he hosted with such pomp the day before.
Friday, May 01, 2026
The Iran War’s Impacts Have Only Just Begun
Another morning arrives and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the price of oil is more than $105/barrel, the average gasoline price in America is around $4.18/gallon, higher fuel prices are driving up the cost of numerous consumer products, and there are no schedule negotiations to end the war of choice that the Felon launched against Iran. The Felon was warned about the potential for Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz and chose to ignore the warns and now the world is living with the consequences of the Felon's arrogance and poorly thought through (if thought through at all) war. Despite the Felon's attempts to distract and spin the situation, the one thing he cannot avoid is that he and he alone is to blame for the current quagmire. Also bearing culpability are congressional Republicans who have voted down war power resolutions that would have put some constraints on the Felon. Obviously, the longer the quagmire continues, the higher the economic price to be paid by regular Americans and, hopefully, the higher the political price paid by Republicans (only 22% of Americans approve of the Felon's handling of the economy). As a piece in The Atlantic lays out, the consequences of the Felon's actions will linger for quite some time with economic pain continuing:
[The Felon
] President Trump, celebrating Tehran’s declaration that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen to commercial shipping, posted on Truth Social on April 17, “IRAN HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THE STRAIT OF IRAN IS FULLY OPEN AND READY FOR FULL PASSAGE.” The opening didn’t last. But, in his haste, [the Felon]Trumphad inadvertently spelled out possibly the most consequential result of his eight-week war: The Strait of Hormuz now looks, in practice, like the “STRAIT OF IRAN.”Although none of the Trump administration’s goals—an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, destroying Iran’s missile capability, neutralizing proxy forces, regime change—has been fulfilled, the war has led to enduring changes. Two sweeping conclusions—one short-term, one longer—have become clear, experts in defense, diplomacy, business, and economics told us.
In the short term, despite an indefinite cease-fire that kicked in last week following an initial two-week pause in hostilities, a durable end to the war isn’t coming anytime soon. The disparity in U.S. and Iranian demands for how negotiations should proceed, along with blockades by their respective forces in the strait, has locked the two sides in a stalemate. Many Americans still expect a quick end to the war’s economic strain. But that’s unlikely. . . . A retired general, a retired CIA analyst, and an energy-industry executive said anywhere from two to nine months, prompting a collective intake of breath from the audience.
Meanwhile, the economic geography of the Persian Gulf is likely changed forever. Iran now has greater authority over the strait than before the war began and stands to benefit from its closure. Iran might start charging exorbitant tolls for all ships that cross the strait. Or a consortium of nations, including Iran, might manage the waterway and split the profits. . . . the regime has proved that it can close the strait at will, despite being confronted by the world’s most powerful military.
That gives Iran extraordinary leverage over the roughly 20 percent of global oil and liquefied-natural-gas supplies that used to pass through the strait. In response, energy companies and shippers are exploring options that could involve billions of dollars in investment in new pipelines, port expansions, and alternative (though hardly fail-safe) routes through the Red Sea. Such a rewiring of global trade routes—akin to supply-chain changes made after the coronavirus pandemic—could ultimately render passage through the Strait of Hormuz unnecessary. But any such result is likely years away.
In the meantime, the grip Iran has on the strait is expected to disrupt business, keep global energy and fertilizer prices elevated for years, exacerbate inflation—and make it much harder for Trump to claim a win in the war he started. . . . Iran has shown no inclination to abandon its leverage, and no further negotiations are scheduled. . . . . That leaves the two countries in a test of who can endure more economic pain.
[P]ushing Iran to the point of yielding could take months or even years, potentially tying up U.S. military resources to enforce the blockade, respond to disruptions, and enforce the terms of any peace settlement.
Representative Ro Khanna of California claimed that the war will cost the average American household $5,000 a year in increased gas and food prices. Trump may face his own imperative to make concessions, given those costs and what the war has done to his popularity: A Reuters/Ipsos poll released this week found that the president’s approval rating stood at 34 percent.
The White House has heard from unhappy Gulf and European allies about the strait’s closure and the unwelcome prospect of future Iranian control. China, whose economy was already struggling, depends heavily on the strait and has urged its reopening. A senior White House official told us that Trump is concerned that the issue could complicate his summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing in a little over two weeks. Yet there are no signs of a quick resolution.
The global economic damage from the first two months of the war has been stark. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been reduced by about 90 percent, from some 120 to 150 daily transits to a handful, according to a new dashboard by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This week, Brent crude reached its highest level in four years, at $126 a barrel. The gas-station billboards that line so many American roads reflect the increase: The average price of a gallon of gas hit $4.18. . . . The World Bank forecasts a 16 percent rise in food-commodity prices this year, driven by increased transport costs and the supply squeeze on the fertilizer industry, which relies on exports from the Gulf. The International Energy Agency has said that the world is on the brink of “the biggest energy security threat in history.”
The prevailing question facing those whose economic survival relies on Gulf exports is no longer when the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, but what role the strait will play in the postwar marketplace. Perhaps in anticipation of the disruptions to come, the UAE announced Tuesday that it was leaving OPEC, which it has long threatened to do, allowing the small country to chart its own course outside OPEC quotas.
Before investing billions, Gulf nations and companies are likely to want some reassurance that those new investments won’t become Iranian targets. In addition to shutting down traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran in the past two months has hit energy infrastructure in neighboring countries. In Saudi Arabia alone, daily oil output is down by 600,000 barrels because of Iranian strikes, a Saudi state news agency said earlier this month. The Fujairah port, a potential new alternative, also has been targeted by Iranian forces.
One diplomat from the Middle East stressed to us that anything other than a return to the strait’s prewar status of being free and open would be unacceptable. But other observers aren’t sure how feasible that is, noting that countries dependent on the strait may decide to work with Tehran instead. “The longer this goes on, the higher the likelihood that countries will look to protect their own economic interests and cut deals with the Iranians, even if that triggers the wrath of the U.S.,” Richard Nephew, a former U.S. deputy special envoy for Iran, told us.
“One of the ironies of this war is that Iran discovered that it had this weapon,” he said. “There was so much talk about nuclear ability, but they have the strait.” . . . Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a Monday appearance on Fox News that the U.S. would not tolerate Iran “trying to normalize” its control of the strait.
How the U.S. and its Gulf allies might avoid that reality is a question that will linger long after the fighting has ended.
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