Sunday, November 15, 2026

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The Pentagon Ignored Warnings About Iran’s Drones

The war with Iran continues with no resolution in sight. While oil prices are down, that could literally change overnight if Iran tightens control of the Strait of Hormuz or steps up attacks on tankers trying to exit the Persian Gulf through the strait.  Add to the mix Iran's large supply of drones - a few reports suggest a drone strike against the Felon has been a possible Iranian option - and the large destruction to the USA's bases in the Middle East a state of war continues of whatever lies the Felon and his incompetent Secretary of Defense may claim. As a very long piece in The Atlantic lays out, one of the U.S.'s biggest vulnerabilities is the inability to stop Iranian drones and the Pentagon - think the Felon and Hegseth - has refused to learn from lessons learned by Ukraine in its war with Russia, particularly interceptors that can take down Russian drone which are based on Iranian drones. This refusal stems from the arrogance and hubris of the Felon and Hegseth who appear dead set on repeating the mistakes of past military leaders that refused to recognize changes in weaponry and the attack methods - e.g., the attack on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the British capital ships, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, at the out set of WWII using Japanese air power ushered out battleships as navies' principal capital ships and saw them replaced by aircraft carrier battle groups.  In both the war in Iran and the war in Ukraine weaponry and tactics are changing rapidly while our incompetent senior leadership seemingly refuse to learn from others. Here are article highlights:

From a distance, the Iranian drone resembled an arrowhead, pointing downward as it dove out of the sky. Its propeller, powered by the kind of motor typically used in dirt bikes and lawnmowers, produced a high-pitched wail. It struck midmorning on March 1, the second day of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, hitting a logistics center in Kuwait used by the American military. Dozens of personnel from the Army Reserve were working at an office building there.

The incoming drone, a variant of the Shahed, slammed through the roof of the building and detonated its payload. Six American service members were killed and more than two dozen wounded, several of them critically—the deadliest attack on U.S. troops in the war.

In Ukraine, which has faced years of attacks from this type of drone, people often compare its sound as it falls out of the sky to a Vespa revving its engine. But the noise no longer terrifies Ukrainians the way it once did. Last year, Ukraine’s arms industry developed a cheap and effective way to shoot down Shaheds. The U.S. military knew about this technology months before the war in Iran began. A group of senior American officers, worried about exactly the type of attack that killed those six soldiers in Kuwait, told me they repeatedly urged commanders in the Middle East to deploy the new Ukrainian technology.

The Pentagon ignored their warnings, which included detailed reports sent up the chain of command. Several of the officers who tried to raise the alarm about Iranian Shaheds have since been fired or forced into early retirement.

In a statement, the Pentagon disputed the officers’ account and said it was “disgusting” for the Atlantic to suggest that the U.S. military was “somehow unprepared” for the start of the war in Iran. “Central Command established the most extensive air defense umbrella in the world over the Middle East,” Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell wrote in the statement.

The warnings were based on Ukraine’s experience with Russia, which acquired Shahed drones from Iran in 2022. Waves of them have pounded Ukrainian cities ever since, often in swarms of a few hundred per night. Last summer, the armed forces of Ukraine deployed a new type of interceptor to destroy Shaheds in midair. U.S. Army officers stationed in Germany began training on these interceptors that fall, and they asked their Ukrainian allies to produce a report about their new invention.

The document, dated December 2025 . . . . described in detail how Ukraine had developed these defensive weapons. A drawing of an interceptor appeared on the cover of the report, alongside a Shahed with a bull’s-eye on its belly. It was shared inside the military and with some U.S. allies in December, roughly two months before the war in Iran started.

The Army’s European Command, led at the time by General Chris “C.D.” Donahue, had by then deployed the new interceptors at bases in Europe, including in Romania and Poland. Donahue and his team in Wiesbaden, Germany, urged their fellow officers to do the same at bases in other regions, especially in the Middle East, where the threat from Iranian drones seemed most obvious to them.

The officers in Wiesbaden sent the document up to their commanders, and they pressed the leadership in Washington to act on it. Had their warnings been heeded, they believe the lives of U.S. soldiers could have been saved.

At the start of this year, the team of officers in Wiesbaden compiled a second report about the Ukrainian interceptors. To ensure the widest possible distribution, the military cleared it for public release in February. The document, roughly 12 pages long, described how European Command had fielded the Ukrainian interceptors at some of its bases. It offered detailed guidance for commanders in other regions to do the same.

No one involved in preparing the two reports knew the timing of the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, which was then widely reported to be in the works. But they understood that any Iranian response would almost certainly involve Shahed drones, which the regime had invented, mass produced, and stockpiled. The second report was published on February 23, too late, as it turned out, for its warnings to make much difference. The war in Iran would start only five days later.

This account of the Pentagon’s failure to defend against these weapons is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former military officers from the U.S. and Ukraine, who were involved in the effort to warn about the danger of Iranian drones and arm U.S. forces with the most effective countermeasures. Most of them spoke on condition of anonymity, because they fear reprisals from their commanders and officials at the Pentagon. . . . He [Hegseth] has also ordered the military to cut 20 percent of the positions reserved for generals and admirals across the armed forces.

Donahue fell victim to that purge this summer. In the final months of his Army career, he worked with the team in Wiesbaden to send hundreds of Ukrainian interceptors to the Middle East, hoping they could defend against another deadly strike on U.S. forces. Hegseth did not support these efforts, the officers involved told me. “The technology is so effective. It’s so cheap,” one of them said. But the top officials in Washington did not want to accept it: “Because of arrogance, they said, Why do we need it?”

[N]ow, nearly five years after Russia invaded, most U.S. military officers would agree that Ukraine offers important lessons on the future of warfare. Its innovations in drone technology have been forged in the deadliest conflict Europe has seen in 80 years. Few American generals recognized their value sooner than Christopher Cavoli, who served until last year as the supreme allied commander of NATO. Roughly a year into the war, he hosted a training exercise with Ukrainian soldiers, and he was stunned by how quickly one of them, a private, figured out how to use a U.S.-military radar system. . . . By the second summer of the war, in 2023, the Ukrainians began to innovate in earnest, especially when it came to drone warfare. “That’s when we realized, Oh, these guys are doing stuff that we don’t do. Let’s go look at it seriously.”

About two years later, in the spring of 2025, NATO invited a team of drone operators from Ukraine to act as the enemy side—the red team—in a round of war games in Estonia. The blue team “took a whipping,” one of the American participants told me. The Ukrainians launched about 30 drone strikes in rapid succession, taking 17 armored vehicles and two NATO battalions out of the game before dinner. The U.S. troops were so unaccustomed to the red team’s tactics that some of them looked up at an incoming drone and waved their arms at its camera. One of the organizers of the drills later used that footage in a presentation to show how much the U.S. military had to learn.

The Ukrainians also went home with a lesson. One of their commanders told me that the NATO troops, maneuvering around in their armored vehicles, had resembled a “golden-armored knight” who showed up for a gunfight with a fancy sword. “They are unable to accept reality,” he said. Drones now account for the great majority of casualties in the war. Ukraine’s military industry produced 4 million of them last year, far outpacing all NATO countries combined.

At first, Ukrainian soldiers tried to shoot them down with machine guns, using spotlights to scan the sky. Whenever possible, they also relied on advanced air-defense systems, such as the Patriot missile, which the U.S. and its allies provided to Ukraine in small batches. Patriots cost several million dollars per shot, and Ukraine needed to conserve them for bigger threats, such as Russian ballistic missiles. It could not afford to use them against drones that cost Russia roughly $35,000 each.

For the engineers at Skyfall, the challenge came down to velocity. None of its drones could fly fast enough to catch Shaheds and ram them from behind. . . . . Within a few months, several Ukrainian companies, including Skyfall, cracked the problem, developing a range of interceptors to take down Shaheds.

To detect the interceptors’ targets, Ukraine also set up a network of acoustic sensors that listened for the noise of incoming Shaheds. The sensors did not require much engineering. Some were just smartphones affixed to long poles. When their mics picked up the sound of a Shahed, Ukraine’s air-defense forces sent up an interceptor to knock it down. The Ukrainian military purchased and deployed thousands of them last year. Before long, the interceptors had all but neutralized the threat, downing Shaheds at a rate of more than 90 percent, according to official estimates.

Last fall and winter, Skyfall gave frequent tours of its interceptor factory to Western officials. Some of the first visitors came from a command within the U.S. Army called Security Assistance Group Ukraine, or SAG-U. Headquartered in Wiesbaden . . . The goals of such visits, apart from facilitating the delivery of U.S. weapons and intelligence, centered on the need for the U.S. military to draw lessons from Ukraine. Donahue would often tell his team that if they failed to study this war, “we would pay the price in blood and treasure.” Their hosts took the Americans to see Ukraine’s most innovative factories, drone units, and command posts.

Some inside the U.S. military, however, still saw it as prudent to prepare for Iran to escalate. Apart from its missile arsenal, Tehran had an enormous stockpile of Shaheds, many of them hidden underground beyond the reach of U.S. air strikes. They were cheap and plentiful enough for Iran to overwhelm the U.S. supply of Patriots and other sophisticated air defenses. Their range of potential targets included every U.S. base in the Middle East, and they could threaten any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the aorta of the global oil supply.

None of the officers in Wiesbaden ever received a clear explanation of why the Trump administration ignored this advice. But the officers sensed two reasons behind the resistance in Washington: arrogance and politics. . . . At the Pentagon, “Hegseth did not want to hear the word Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian official told me of that period.

U.S. Army officers in Europe sensed a similar toxicity. If you brought up Ukraine at the Pentagon, “if you were lucky, you were met with a sneer,” one of them told me. Under the Biden administration, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin received weekly updates from SAG-U about the war. Once Hegseth took over, those briefings stopped. So did nearly all U.S. military aid to Ukraine.

Around that time, Zelensky and Trump began negotiating a deal for the U.S. to purchase Ukraine’s most advanced military equipment. . . . . But after a few rounds of talks, the U.S. shelved the deal last fall. That decision came down to American hubris, one of the Ukrainian officials involved in the negotiations told me at the time. The message from the White House amounted to this, he said: “Know your place. We have the greatest military in the world. We don’t need anything from you.”

The previous week, U.S. and Israeli air strikes managed to kill much of Iran’s leadership. But Iran’s arsenal of missiles and drones allowed it to stay in the fight far longer than Trump expected. Its response featured a barrage of Shahed drones, by some estimates more than 2,000, aimed at targets across the Middle East: military bases, airports, and logistics hubs used by the Americans, as well as civilian targets and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere in the region.

In trying to shoot down the drones, the U.S. and its allies quickly burned through most of their supply of Patriot missiles. In some cases, such as with the Shahed strike on the base in Kuwait, U.S. air defenses failed—with deadly consequences.

One of the survivors of that strike, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Halbur, recalled waking up in the wreckage of his office, his uniform covered in blood, and the bones of his right elbow falling away. One of his comrades, Major Stephen Ramsbottom, later told the Associated Press that the base should have been better defended. “This type of fight has been going on for five years in Ukraine, and our excuse is we didn’t expect it to happen to us,” he said. “That’s preposterous in my mind.”

On the sixth day of the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine would send equipment and experts to the Middle East to help the U.S. counter Iranian drones. Trump seemed open to the arrangement. In an interview with Reuters, he declared the same day that he would accept “any assistance from any country.” But his position flipped a week later. “No, we don’t need their help in drone defense,” Trump said on Fox News Radio on March 13. “We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.”

In the Middle East, Iran has already used this weapon against U.S. forces, which have relied on Patriot missiles, fighter jets, and other sophisticated hardware to shoot them down. Ukraine appears close to a much more efficient solution. But the U.S. has no deal to buy this new generation of interceptors. For the officers in Wiesbaden, it looked like a sign that the Pentagon could make the same mistake twice: ignoring the latest innovations and, in the process, putting the lives of its troops in danger.

Eight months after the deadly strike in Kuwait, the U.S military has still not deployed the sort of network of sensors and interceptors Ukraine uses against Shaheds. According to the latest estimates, the U.S. has used up nearly three-quarters of its Patriot missiles since the start of the war in Iran. Replenishing that stockpile will take years. In the meantime, U.S. soldiers in the Middle East are staying close to their air-raid shelters, keeping their ears pricked for the whine of inbound drones.

The incompetence and hubris at the top starting with the orange Jabba the Hut is both stunning and a danger to our troops.

Sunday Morning Male Beauty

 


Saturday, November 14, 2026

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The Felon: A Mediocre, Miserable Man

If one has read any of the writings of Mary Trump, a licensed Ph.D. psychologist and the Felon's niece, it quickly becomes clear that the Felon is one screwed up individual who seemingly is only happy when showered with flattery and, of course, enriching himself, typically at the expense of others.  Given his malignant narcissism he campaigned for Republicans in the 2026 mid-terms by repeatedly telling anyone who would listen to vote as if he was on the ballot. It definitely proved to be a case of be careful what you wish for because voters took his statements to heart and overwhelmingly voted against him and pretty much Republicans up and down the ballot.  With the last undecided U.S. Senate race trending toward the Democrat candidate, the Felon is facing 56 Democrats in the Senate and pushing 260 Democrats in the House of Representatives.  But the GOP wreckage is far more severe with Texas turning blue and with Republicans losing almost every state wide office and Democrats breaking the Republican stranglehold on the Texas state legislature.  Similar disasters happened in other states with Kansas electing a Democrat to the U.S. Senate for the first time since 1932 and a Democrat winning the governorship. True to form, the Felon disclaims any responsibility for the nearly unprecedented electoral disaster.  A piece at The New Republic looks at the miserable occupant of the White House whose policies spread misery to others:

In the course in international relations I took with him as a Harvard undergraduate in the early 1960s, when he was still a mere professor of government, Henry Kissinger had certain personal observations that he would frequently reiterate, a main one of which was, “In retrospect, everything looks inevitable.” [The Felon] President Donald Trump, halfway through his second term in office, suddenly—and, I would guess, to a certain extent unexpectedly, to him—finds his political power severely circumscribed. Was this midterm election outcome, more extreme in its repudiation of his government than virtually anyone anticipated, foreordained by Trump’s egomaniacal approach to business, politics, and other people in general?

An argument could be made that the undoing of his presidency was bound to happen. Another concept I picked up in my undergraduate studies was that of “omnipotence of thought.” This is the conviction that one’s thoughts or beliefs can not only influence the external world but control it. Trump came into the business world and later political office with a set of misguided and inflexible beliefs and habits, instilled in him first by a stern and un-loving father, which were extended and fortified by the man who became not only his attorney but his political mentor, the notoriously ruthless and unprincipled Roy Cohn, chief counsel to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch-hunt hearings in the 1950s.

In the three books that his niece, Mary L. Trump, has written about him, she has made clear that her uncle was raised by a cold, ruthless, mercenary father and a largely absent and sickly mother. The lack of love in the household, to Mary, is the most telling aspect of Donald’s upbringing. The film The Apprentice (2024), which highlights Cohn’s mentorship of him, makes clear the essence of Cohn’s tutelage of Donald: No matter what, no matter how wrong you might be or turn out to be about a given matter or issue, you must never bend, never give up your adherence to a position, no matter how misguided it might turn out to be. And incidentally, the film also highlights the instance in which “The Donald,” as his first wife, Ivana, called him, allegedly raped her as she was spurning his unwanted conjugal advances.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Trump would stake out positions that are autarkic in nature, for himself as an individual as well as for the country. Autarky is a state of self-sufficiency and self-absorption that is as complete as possible. Trump does not brook advice from other people as to what he should or should not do in a given circumstance. Therefore, in his first term as president, when anyone in the government or the White House of high caliber—say, for instance, his first chief of staff, retired Marine General John Kelly—tried to offer advice contrary to his own inclination, he would chafe against it in annoyance. In his second term, he stacked his Cabinet with pliant, mediocre individuals who would never dare challenge his inclinations, no matter how wayward or bizarre they might be.

Having managed to kidnap the president of Venezuela, which has an estimated population of 28.6 million and no more than 150,000 military personnel, he then fantasized that he could similarly subdue the vastly larger nation of Iran, with its estimated population of 93.4 million and approximately 610,000 military personnel, including its notoriously brutal Revolutionary Guard. In this latter case, U.S. bombardment killed the nation’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and subsequent strikes did away with many of the country’s top leaders, including, it is believed, many of the identified moderate leaders, those who U.S. analysts believed would have been open to striking a reasonable deal with the United States over the issue of nuclear weapons.

During his 2024 campaign, this magazine ran a picture of him with a faint mustache and short haircut that suggested he might be an American Hitler. We were far from alone in making such a comparison. But as it has turned out, he was not such. . . . . He did not cancel the 2026 political elections, or make any serious moves to undermine them, much to the surprise of many. His reaction to the election results, so far, has been muted, and it appears that he may content himself with pursuing his various construction projects during the rest of his second term. Which is not to say that he won’t get up to some forms of mischief. His top priority, clearly—and one doomed to failure—is and has been trying to turn the United States back into an overwhelmingly white country; hence his attacks on all programs involving affirmative action and his relentless efforts to deport as many noncitizen residents of color in the country as possible as rapidly as possible . . .

Beyond that, I think he aspires to reduce every aspect of excellence in the country to a level of mediocrity, which is to say, down to his very own level. And at this, I confidently predict, he will woefully fail, as he has failed so often at his major endeavors throughout his miserable life.

Saturday Morning Male Beauty


 

Friday, November 13, 2026

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We Just Witnessed an Electoral Regicide

The Felon views himself as a monarch or dictator with unfettered powers and has engaged in levels of corruption and excesses that are reminiscent of out of touch monarchs of fallen dynasties. Constant lies and untruths have flowed from  his mouth and that of his sycophants who view themselves as the would be monarch's untouchable courtiers.  Last week's mid-term elections witnesses a resounding rejection of the Felon and his policies - he stupidly asked voters to vote like he was on the ballot and that's precisely what they did - in what in some ways is akin to a regicide.  Both the Felon and his Republican enablers in Congress paid a high price at the ballot box for shocking overreach, endless lies, gross incompetence, and "Marie Antoinette" moments - not to malign France's one time queen - and policies that benefit the very rich while slashing social programs that saved millions of Americans from an even uglier and more brutal existence.  As a column in the New York Times lays out, such drastic resets have happened in the past when all too powerful presidents have seen their wings clipped by voters who want a return to normalcy and the traditional separation of powers.  Unlike past presidents faced with such a public rejection, the Felon so far appears to be ignoring the will of the voters.  Indeed, his appointment of Stephen Miller as chief of staff, defense of Pete Hegseth, and his DOJ's threats to members of Congress exercising oversight responsibilities are tantamount to giving the middle finger to voters.  Here are column highlights:

The American political system is enormously elastic. In times of genuine emergency, our institutions have proved themselves remarkably adept at unified action, usually under vigorous presidential leadership. Those are the moments — from wars to terrorist attacks — that are prominent in our history books. Few recognize, however, that our system is just as capable of institutional contraction. When a powerful presidency is no longer seen as necessary, voters know how to end it.

This year’s midterms were a rare instance of such a restoration election. They have occurred in the past — after major wars, mostly — when crises have subsided and voters have chosen to restore something approaching status quo antebellum or, as Warren G. Harding put it after World War I, a return to “normalcy.”

Most of these elections produced, as happened last week, a loss for the president’s party in both chambers of Congress. In every case, the message has been unmistakable: It’s time to go back to normal procedure and no longer be beholden to the sitting president’s rule. These restorations have been so painful for the incumbent that they are essentially a unique form of American regicide.

There have been several restorations throughout American history. Three are especially informative. As the armistice was being prepared to end World War I, President Woodrow Wilson feared that his leadership would be undermined by a midterm change in party control.

Wilson had, in recent years, directed the movements of millions of soldiers and sailors; he had confiscated the nation’s railroads for public purpose; his agents instructed Americans how much sugar they were allowed to put in their morning coffee. Still, Wilson found it necessary to go to the American people in the 1918 midterms with an appeal to continue his rule; they refused and sent Republican majorities to each chamber. Wilson, who once had near-dictatorial power, was kneecapped.

He subsequently embarked on a vast publicity campaign to salvage his dearest postwar aim: the League of Nations. Unable to pass his signature treaty in Congress, he tried to go directly to the voters to drum up support. It was an exercise in futility that undermined his health and effectively ended his presidency. The institution he bequeathed to his successors in the 1920s was a mere shadow of his wartime office.

That situation lasted until the early 1930s. The Great Depression and World War II once again vested exceptional power in the executive. After the war concluded, Harry S. Truman had an awful time of it. The 1946 midterms saw Republicans sweep Democrats out of power, not unlike the defeat Winston Churchill suffered across the Atlantic.

Like Wilson, Truman still had two years to go. In 1948, voters would elect him to a full term, a byproduct of the emerging Cold War. But a presidency that had controlled a managed economy, mobilized perhaps the largest military effort in history and deployed the deadliest weapon ever assembled was no more. “Our American concept of government rests upon the idea of a dominant Congress,” the new Republican House speaker declared — and quickly set about making it a reality once again.

The restoration election after the Cold War came at the expense of Bill Clinton. Newt Gingrich’s argument that the country ought to return to a proper constitutional order, one that placed Capitol Hill at the center of political gravity, was persuasive in 1994. The House of Representatives and the Senate came under unified Republican control for the first time since the 1950s.

Of course, President Trump’s claims to emergency leadership did not repeat the usual pattern. His contestable emergencies — including an alleged flood of illicit drugs across the Canadian border and a threat to the “free expression rights of United States persons” by Brazil — bore no resemblance to Pearl Harbor or the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Crisis normally makes the president, not vice versa. Mr. Trump’s advisers no doubt had read their primers on American politics and knew that their constant declarations of emergencies would help them avoid those pesky checks and balances that typically constrain presidential behavior. A friendly Congress barely noticed. A new, oppositional one will.

Before last week, Americans could not be sure if Mr. Trump’s artificial emergencies would end, as all legitimate emergencies have, with the American people energizing the independent legislative branch. But on Nov. 3, they asserted their rights; Mr. Trump’s emergency claims will no longer be his alone to make.

One might think that the magnitude of his defeat would moderate Mr. Trump’s aggressive unilateralism. The early signs are not encouraging.

The president, by one account, “must exercise power alone.” One observer noted that the president is known to anger at any challenge to his authority and “his will must prevail.” Those words were written not about Mr. Trump, but Woodrow Wilson. This history is decidedly unhelpful to Mr. Trump. As Wilson discovered, a restoration Congress will not share the president’s sense of urgency. Any emergency the president now asserts will be understood as a direct affront to a congressional majority that is unlikely to take intrusions on its turf lightly.

The Cold War very likely saved Truman’s presidency; an unexpected event could do the same for Mr. Trump. A lesson of history is that no election — and no set of conditions — is ever permanent. We are always one war, or one peace, away from a profoundly different institutional equilibrium.

When Mr. Trump’s term expires, some candidates will doubtless attempt to follow in his footsteps and seek to turn an overweening presidency to non-Trumpian ends. Those opportunists would use his excesses as guideposts, attempting similar action perhaps on health care, affordability or business regulation. Others will remain committed to time-tested constitutionalism and return fully to a system of separate institutions sharing power — including a robust executive, but only when it is needed.

The constitutionalists have the better of the arguments. Our history amply demonstrates that Americans are functionally believers in Madisonian separation of powers, even if they don’t realize it, repeatedly dividing the government against itself to compel compromise and consensus instead of seeking always the efficient rule of one. That’s the very source of restoration elections.

This year’s midterms are a vivid reminder, then, that for all its deficiencies, a separated system of government has proved both durable and self-correcting. It is precisely our ability to rein in the presidential license to dictatorial power, whether issued under false pretenses or legitimate strain, that keeps Americans ready to deploy a dominant presidency again when conditions genuinely demand it.


Friday Morning Male Beauty