Is a Tide Turning Against Populism?

Slovakia’s new president, Zuzana Caputova.

Populism is defined as "a political approach that strives to appeal to ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups."  It certainly describes the nature of Donald Trump's base which is enraged that it is losing white privilege and/or its ability to impose its toxic form of Christianity on the nation.  It is also the mind set behind the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the election of various right wing, authoritarian politicians across Europe.  To take hold, of course, there was a need for other voters who did not celebrate racism, the embrace of ignorance, and the destruction of democratic norms to be apathetic and fail to vote thereby allowing foul individuals like Trump to triumph.  As a piece in the New York Times explores, the tide may be beginning to turn on populism with voters realizing the need to vote and throw aside complacency.  One can only hope the piece is correct and the rejection of populism and authoritarians occurs in America as well.  Here are article highlights: 

While most eyes are fixed on Iran and China, the competition between the liberal international order and the populist demagogues who threaten it has taken an unexpected turn. In a seemingly unlikely region, a rear-guard action has quietly begun to challenge the “populist surge.”

With Britain seemingly on the verge of Brexit and Donald Trump something of a global albatross, some analysts have written off liberalism. But others have kept faith that liberalism remains strong, and that they still expect a “backlash to the backlash” to emerge in Western Europe.

They may be right. Intriguing developments are taking place, but not necessarily in the West. Instead — surprisingly — they are to be found in Central and Eastern Europe.
The region’s countries became part of the liberal order only after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc in 1989 . . . . But in recent months they have become ground zero for what is beginning to look like a comeback for liberal forces, at least within the region. More than ten different countries have voted out populists, undergone serious protests, or taken strong stands against Russia.

The reigning orthodoxy is that it’s only a matter of time until far-right populist parties begin winning elections in country after country. But the evidence from across Central Europe runs counter to that: Liberal leaders and activists have begun to push back against populism.

The most interesting case is Slovakia, where the polls leading up to this spring’s election showed a pair of populist candidates in the lead. But in the end a less bombastic Western-oriented political novice eked out an impressive victory. The victor, Zuzana Caputova, took advantage of anti-populist sentiment spurred by the murder of a crusading anti-corruption journalist.

Likewise in Poland, local elections and major mayoral races over the past two years have been won by liberal candidates, rather than Poland’s populist governing party. While in Bulgaria, in 2017, Bulgarians voted out a populist Russia-centric government and brought back to power a pro-NATO and pro-European Union former prime minister, Boiko Borisov.

What’s more, Ms. Caputova’s rise and solid block of support . . . . are inspiring opposition leaders in other countries. In the Czech Republic, for example, hundreds of thousands of protesters have been marching against their prime minister, Andrej Babis, a former businessman with alarmingly demagogic leanings who has been accused of corruption.

Hungary, Romania, Moldova and Georgia have also experienced significant anti-populist protests in the past two years. Hungarians turned out in large numbers this spring to protest against the most well-known populist head of government in Europe, Viktor Orban, who has a reputation for undermining democracy through his corruption, economic mismanagement and clamping down on the media. The Romanian people recently celebrated the jailing of Liviu Dragnea, the country’s most powerful politician and head of the ruling Social Democratic Party, which had defied the European Commission and made repeated efforts to shield politicians from the law.

Central European countries have also taken strong stands or direct actions against Russia. Greece expelled Russian diplomats in response to Russian interference in the naming of North Macedonia. In 2016, Montenegro arrested a range of violent coup plotters who were backed by Russia. This year, 14 of them were convicted and sentenced to prison.

These anti-populist trends have occurred in the face of heavy Russian interference in the form of cyber warfare and in some cases the direct intervention of Federal Security Service agents. Russia also interfered in the European Parliament elections in May, which polls and pundits had predicted would bring a populist takeover. However, not only did numerous populists — like Germany’s A.F.D. party — perform less well than expected, but they are also far from being able to form a majority.

Populists have also been kept out of recent governments formed in Finland, Sweden and Estonia. . . . Spain’s Socialist Party routed the populists with ease, and the right-leaning young Austrian leader Sebastian Kurz, after losing a vote of confidence that cost him his role as chancellor, appears well positioned to fight for a new term in coming elections, having jettisoned the populist contingent from his coalition. And last weekend, Greece’s far-right Golden Dawn party performed surprisingly poorly in an election that brought to power a traditional center-right party and prime minister.

Yet the question remains: Is a discernible trend at work here? Either way, logic may well be on the liberals’ side. First, populist leaders tend to be poor at governing, particularly in the area of economic policy. Second, the more Russia continues to rattle its sabers and make European countries feel insecure, the more places like Poland will avoid becoming too populist. Third, while electorates in Europe have been withdrawing their support from traditional center-left and center-right parties, liberal, green and other parties offer decidedly anti-populist policies.

We may need more time to ascertain whether a larger global “backlash to the backlash” trend is afoot. But in Central Europe the evidence is clear. . . . . the battle against populism has been joined by regrouped liberal forces. The vaunted liberal international order, however damaged, remains intact to a significant degree.

Here in Virginia, a blow can be struck against the populism and arrogance of the Virginia GOP in November if people get out and vote the corrupt, political whores of the GOP who have sold their souls to the gun lobby and far right Christian extremists out of office. 

Why Democrats Can’t Win White Working-Class Voters

This post in some ways follows up on the last one and looks at the lingering problems faced by Democrats who are seen as the party of minorities.   The good news in the long term is that eventually, minorities will be the majority and white voters the minority.  Until then, the issue becomes one of finding policies and candidates that can win back some of the white working class voter block.  A piece in Slate looks at the issue.  Here are excerpts:

The Democratic Party styles itself a fighter for the working class. But a substantial part of that class—the white part—wants nothing to do with it. If we count the white working class as whites without college degrees, then congressional Democrats lost them by 30 points in last week’s elections, contributing to losses in states as diverse as Iowa, Maine, Colorado, North Carolina, and Florida.

Democrats don’t have to win this group as much as they have to avoid a rout. If they can do that—and hold Republicans to a majority rather than a supermajority—then they can avoid the Republican waves of the recent midterm elections, and strengthen their presidential majority.

Hence the recurring debate of how to win these voters, or at least a portion of them. In a recent feature for the Washington Monthly, for example, Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin argue that Democrats can capitalize on the generational divide in the white working class.  . . . “Today’s young white working-class voters are notably more liberal on issues concerning the role of government” than their older counterparts note Teixeira and Halpin. And significantly these young whites are “significantly more open to rising diversity than the white working class as a whole.”

Implicit in all of this is the assumption voters will believe the pitch. That they’ll hear the case for stronger programs, higher minimum wages, and higher taxes on the rich, and believe Democrats are advocating for them, and not some other group.

The problem is I don’t think we can make that assumption.

After all, working-class whites didn’t leave the Democratic Party over insufficiently populist policy and rhetoric. . . . . No, the proximate cause of the break was the Democratic Party’s close identification with black Americans, who—after the riots of the late ’60s and ’70s—became identified with urban disorder and welfare.

 Specifically, whites were bewildered and infuriated with liberals who defended rioting communities—correctly noting the decades of deprivation and abuse that led to those violent outbursts—and pushed anti-poverty programs to address the underlying conditions. Black incomes rose while at the same time, many white incomes were beginning to stagnate or even fall. Why was the government spending our tax dollars on them, working-class whites asked, when they destroy their neighborhoods and refuse to work, and we’re losing our jobs and our homes?

Part of this was just racism. For most of the post-war era, whites were empowered by the federal government to separate themselves and their lives from black Americans. 

But part of it was something broader. After all, there wasn’t a backlash to government programs writ large. Then, as now, working-class whites are ardent supporters of Social Security and Medicare. But to them, our retirement programs came with an implicit social contract: If you work and contribute to society, society will care for you into your old age. By contrast, you didn’t have to work to benefit from anti-poverty programs, in fact, you could riot and still receive government benefits.

What matters is that they pay taxes but don’t get the same kind of benefits. Again, here’s Drum:

It’s pointless to argue that this perception is wrong. Maybe it is, maybe it’s not. But it’s there. And although it’s bound up with plenty of other grievances—many of them frankly racial, but also cultural, religious, and geographic—at its core you have a group of people who are struggling and need help, but instead feel like they simply get taxed and taxed for the benefit of someone else. Always someone else. If this were you, you wouldn't vote for Democrats either.

Democrats can adopt populist rhetoric, but there’s no guarantee working-class whites will buy it. Indeed, in parts of the country—like the Deep South—it’s a lost cause. The Democratic Party is too associated with blacks and too associated with welfare to win over enough whites to make a difference.

[F]or a new rhetoric of populism to work—or at least, attract the winnable whites identified by Teixeira and Halpin—it needs to come with a commitment to universal policies that working-class whites like and support . . . . But the United States doesn’t have a political party to support that kind of social democracy. Instead, it has the Democratic Party, a collection of disparate interests which—at its best—is nervous about economic liberalism and hesitant to push anything outside the mainstream.

Does the Rise of David Brat Signal A Revolt Against the GOP's New Gilded Age?

I will be candid.  I find David Brat, the Tea Party hero who defeated Eric Cantor last week in the GOP primary, in many ways to be down right scary.  He's in bed with the Christian Right - the Tea Party is after all 85-90% far right Christian - and certainly is no friend to gays or anyone who isn't a white heterosexual conservative Christian.  But, as a piece in Politico notes - he also is no friend of those in the GOP who are striving to return America to the Gilded Age of 100+ years ago.  In fact, a some of his economic positions almost sound liberal when he is condemning wealth disparity and rapacious big business. Thus, Brat may well be the unexpected leader of a revolt against the agenda of the Koch brothers and others of their ilk within the GOP who see themselves as a reincarnation of the robber barons of old.  Here are some article highlights:

All of these explanations [as to why Cantor lost] may be at least partially true. But perhaps the enduring significance of this election will be that Brat’s campaign was a textbook example of the new right-wing populism. It also revealed affinities with populist campaigns going back to the 19th century as well as curious similarities with left-wing populism in more recent years.

The most striking aspect of Brat’s core stump speech is that while he is caustically critical of politicians from both parties, his main target is business and the “gazillionaires” who suck up a disproportionate share of America’s wealth. He blasts his opponent for having voted for TARP (thereby rewarding the big banks, Wall Street and America’s Chinese creditors) and the farm bill (enriching huge agribusiness), as well as for watering down the STOCK Act, which would have prevented members of Congress from engaging in insider trading. But Cantor’s real puppet-masters, according to Brat, are the “crony capitalists” on K Street and nefarious business organizations like the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. Cantor is “completely beholden to corporate interests” and seeks “to sell America to the highest bidder.”

There’s some truth to this critique. As one Wall Street Journal headline on his big-money ties succinctly put it, “Eric Cantor’s loss a blow to Wall Street.”

But Brat goes further. Business influence is so entrenched and widespread on Capitol Hill, he says, that “There is just one party up in D.C. right now”: the money-and-power party. While the “donor class” has easy access to Congress, the business-controlled government is not just indifferent to average citizens but actively despises them and wants to take away their freedoms. The government is actively persecuting ordinary people through NSA spying, IRS investigations and regulations that force families to spend their money on expensive light bulbs rather than food. And the public has no voice, since business controls the media while establishment Republicans like Cantor silence voters through “slating”and other machine-politics tactics. The result is that the United States has become a ruined, broken country . . . . .

[A]lthough Brat depicts illegal immigration as the No. 1 national problem, he focuses his ire not so much on the immigrants themselves as on the corporate interests that require their political lackeys to vote for open borders and amnesty. The “big guys” thereby get to enjoy cheap immigrant labor while also benefiting from immigrants driving down wages for American workers.

Much of Brat’s rhetoric could have been lifted directly from the 1892 platform of the People’s Party, better known as the Populists. Like Brat, the Populists of old declared that they were living in “a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin.” At the root of this corruption were big businesses and great fortunes that dominated both parties, silenced public opinion and “subsidized or muzzled” the media.

I suspect that the so-called GOP establishment does not want to see too many more David Brats come to the fore.