Exodus of College-Educated Whites from the GOP

In my youth, Republicans valued education and knowledge. Indeed, many prided themselves on their high level of education and it was Democrats who were viewed as being "working class."  There was a reason for the term country club Republicans, a majority of which were educated professionals.  Nowadays, the demographics of the two party has flipped and college educate whites have migrated to the Democrat party as the less educated has shifted to the GOP.  Evangelical Christians who studies have shown are the least educated of various religious denominations make up the core of the GOP base, a base that, in my view, celebrates ignorance and is motivated by racism and fears of those deemed "other" - a term that applies to anyone who is not a white, conservative Christian (using the term "Christian" loosely, since these conservatives show little Christian behavior).  A lengthy column the New York Times looks at the exodus of educated whites from the GOP.  Here are highlights:  

In less than a decade, from 2010 to 2018, whites without a college degree grew from 50 to 59 percent of all the Republican Party’s voters, while whites with college degrees fell from 40 to 29 percent of the party’s voters. The biggest shift took place from 2016 to 2018, when Trump became the dominant figure in American politics.

This movement of white voters has been evolving over the past 60 years. A paper published earlier this month, “Secular Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Socioeconomic Reconfiguration of White Partisan Support since the New Deal Era,” provides fresh insight into that transformation.

The authors, Herbert Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm, political scientists at Duke and Ohio State, make the argument that the transition from an industrial to a knowledge economy has produced “tectonic shifts” leading to an “education-income partisan realignment” — a profound realignment of voting patterns that has effectively turned the political allegiances of the white sector of the New Deal coalition that dominated the middle decades of the last century upside down.

Driven by what the authors call “first dimension” issues of economic redistribution, on the one hand, and by the newer “second dimension issues of citizenship, race and social governance,” the traditional alliances of New Deal era politics — low-income white voters without college degrees on the Democratic Party side, high-income white voters with degrees on the Republican side — have switched places. According to this analysis, these two constituencies are primarily motivated by “second dimension” issues, often configured around racial attitudes, which frequently correlate with level of education.

[T]he surge of whites into the Republican Party has been led by whites with relatively high incomes — in the top two quintiles of the income distribution — but without college degrees, a constituency that is now decisively committed to the Republican Party.

According to the census, the top two income quintiles in 2017 were made up of those with household incomes above $77,552. More than half of the voters Kitschelt and Rehm describe as high income are middle to upper middle class, from households making from $77,522 to $130,000 — not, by contemporary standards, wealthy.

It’s higher income/low education whites who are currently still doing well, but fear that in the Knowledge Society their life chances are shrinking as high education becomes increasingly the ticket to economic and social success.

Low-income whites without college degrees have moved to the Republican Party, but because they frequently hold liberal economic views — that is, they support redistributionist measures from which they benefit — they are conflicted in their partisan allegiance.

High-income whites without college degrees were swing voters sixty years ago, pursued by both parties; now, they are rock-ribbed Republicans. Their share of the white electorate has fallen, however, from 42.1 to 22.0 percent. In the 1950s, high-income whites with college degrees were the base of the Republican Party — although in 1952 they made up just 6.7 percent of white voters. By 2016, this cohort had moved decisively toward the Democratic Party, as its share of the white electorate had grown to 26.0 percent. The key bloc for both Trump and the Republican Party is made up of white Christian evangelicals. Eight out of ten of these voters cast ballots for Trump, and intensely religious voters make up 40 percent of the Republican electorate. Carney and Enos see race prejudice as setting itself against the broad category of “other.” They have devised an experiment that addresses the tradition of allowing “humanity to be divided into two groups: one that embodies the norm and whose identity is valued, and another whose identity is defined by its faults, devalued and susceptible to discrimination.” The 2020 election will be fought over the current loss of certainty — the absolute lack of consensus — on the issue of “race.” Fear, anger and resentment are rampant. Democrats are convinced of the justness of the liberal, humanistic, enlightenment tradition of expanding rights for racial and ethnic minorities. Republicans, less so. This may well prove to be a base-vs.-base election, but even so the outcome may lie in the hands of the substantial proportion of the electorate that is undecided — 7 percent according to Pew. And if Democrats want to give themselves the best shot of getting Trump out of the White House, it is toward these voters that they must make concerted efforts at pragmatic diplomacy and persuasion — and show a new level of empathy.

Trump’s America Is Not a Safe Place for Jews - or Those Labeled as "Other"

A column in the Washington Post laments that America is quickly becoming a place that is not safe for Jews thanks to the growing anti-Semiticism made normal by the occupant of the White House.  The piece recounts the ways in which Trump has embraced the Alt-Right which has long targeted Jews along with pretty much all minorities as well as LGBT Americans.  It's a trend that reminds one of the rise of dictators in Europe in the late 1920's and early 1930's not to mention the white nationalists who are seeking to reassert their power in places as disparate as rural areas of the United Kingdom supporting Brexit, to Hungary and Brazil where an extremist just won the presidency.  The trend throughout is the dehumanizing of those who are perceived as different which in turn opens the door for violence against those targeted.  Disgustingly, here in America, Trump and far right Republicans disclaim any responsibility for the hatred they are unleashing.  Here are column highlights:

George Washington, in his 1790 letter to the Touro Synagogue in Newport, R.I., told Jews they would be safe in the new nation.

“The government of the United States . . . gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance,” he wrote. “May the children of the stock of Abraham who dwell in this land continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other inhabitants — while every one shall sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree and there shall be none to make him afraid.”

Though that assurance has been tested, the United States has endured as a safe haven for Jews.

Now President Trump has violated Washington’s compact. He has given sanction to bigotry and assistance to persecution. After the shooting in Pittsburgh, which the Anti-Defamation League believes is the deadliest anti-Semitic attack in U.S. history, there is no longer safety under the vine and fig tree.

I had been dreading and expecting this day, and more like it, for two years. This was more than predictable; it was predicted.

After Trump’s presidential campaign began with genteel anti-Semitism, progressed to dog whistles and ended with a full-throated targeting of Jewish “globalists,” I wrote on Election Day that the results would be coming in on the 78th anniversary of Kristallnacht, the infamous night of Nazi violence and vandalism against German Jews: “I pray that on this solemn anniversary, Americans tell Donald Trump and the world that we are never going back there.”

After Charlottesville, when Trump said there “were very fine people” marching among the neo-Nazis chanting “Jews will not replace us,” I wrote about my daughter’s fear of returning to Hebrew school because of violence; armed white supremacists had chanted “Sieg Heil” and forced worshipers to flee a Charlottesville synagogue.

Consider some of the many times Trump gave sanction to bigotry before 11 worshipers were shot dead at the Tree of Life:

Telling Jewish Republicans they wouldn’t support him “because I don’t want your money.”

Tweeting an image from an anti-Semitic message board with a Star of David atop a pile of cash.

Saying “I don’t have a message” for supporters who threatened anti-Semitic violence against a Jewish journalist, and Melania Trump saying the writer “provoked” the threats.
Branding his campaign with the “America First” slogan of the anti-Semitic pre-war movement.

Alleging that “blood suckers” and “a global power structure” including “international banks” are secretly plotting against ordinary Americans.

And, when urged by the Anti-Defamation League to stop using traditionally anti-Semitic tropes, repeating the tropes in an ad with images of prominent Jews, including George Soros.

Once in office, in addition to making common cause with the Nazis of Charlottesville, Trump stocked his administration with Stephen K. Bannon and other figures of the nationalist “alt-right;” hesitated to condemn the rise of anti-Semitic threats and vandalism; issued a Holocaust remembrance statement without mention of Jews; lamented the attempts to silence Alex Jones, who peddles anti-Semitic conspiracy theories; and, declaring himself a “nationalist,” increased verbal attacks on “globalists,” particularly Soros.

Whatever Trump’s motives, his words and deeds inspire the hateful and the violent. The man accused of sending pipe bombs to a dozen favorite Trump targets (including Soros) eschewed politics, his family’s lawyer says, until he “found a father in Trump.” The accused Pittsburgh gunman, though apparently rejecting Trump for being insufficiently nationalist, embraced on social media the themes Trump has popularized: the “globalist” danger, immigrant “invaders that kill our people” and an “infestation” of undesirables.

[P]roceeding with a rally mere hours after the massacre, he galvanized the crowd with the same complaint the alleged Pittsburgh killer cited in social media before the carnage: the migrant caravan. Trump told the crowd, “No caravans, right? We don’t want caravans. We’re not having caravans.”  “Build the wall!” the crowd chanted.

Be very afraid.

Who’s Afraid of a White Minority?

Donald Trump/Mike Pence and the Republican Party have used racial division and fanning the flames of white fears (especially working class white fears) over whites becoming a demographic minority in America as the number one means to mobilize their base.  Study after study has shown that "economic anxiety" was NOT the motivating factor for why working class whites - and, I would argue a number of my Republican "friends" voted for Trump/Pence.  It all boils down to racism and  an irrational fear of anyone deemed "other." Having lived in Hampton, Virginia, a white minority city for the last nine (9) years, I find the fears ridiculous and irrational.  If Hampton has economic problems, most stem from an incompetent white city manager who the City Council refuses to fire and replace with someone with some vision and imagination. 

Meanwhile, the Hampton Yacht Club, once the bastion of white Hampton, has minority members and - the horror in the minds of Christofascists - gay members such as myself.  The club in fact has record levels of membership and is doing just fine with an expanded membership base. As for "non-whites," both the husband and I have those who the Census Bureau would label as "non-white in our families. Indeed, under the Census Bureau standards I could be considered Hispanic given my mother's "origin" in Central America in a Spanish speaking country, not that anyone in my family has ever classified themselves as Hispanic.  A lengthy column in the New York Times looks at the inaccuracies of how the Census Bureau defines race and the manner Trump and the GOP have cynically and dangerously whipped irrationally insecure whites into a frenzy:  Here are highlights:

The question of whether America will become a majority-minority nation — and when that might happen — is intensely disputed, of enormous political import and extraordinarily complex.

Two articles that appeared in the opinion section of The Times over the past few years made the case that misleading statistical artifacts used by the Census Bureau have increased the fear of a majority-minority America, a fear that played a crucial role in the 2016 election.

Both Richard Alba, of CUNY, in “The Myth of the White Minority,” and Herbert Gans, of Columbia, in “The Census and Right Wing Hysteria,” argued that questionable census classifications led to an undercount of America’s white majority. This anxiety over the decline of white hegemony, in turn, helped propel a segment of conservative voters to cast ballots for Donald Trump.

Not so fast, say William Frey of Brookings, Lilliana Mason of the University of Maryland and Justin Gest of George Mason University. They argue that mixed-race Americans who identify as white are not always viewed — or accepted — as white by other Americans. As Mason put it to me in an email, “people who are racially motivated to dislike immigrants” will “not be assuaged by the argument that one day immigrants will just be white people.”

[I]n 2017, Alba addressed the interrelated questions of how mixed-race Americans classify themselves, how the census classifies them and how the census classification deals with the offspring of racially and ethnically mixed parents. Alba writes:

Currently, 14 to 15 percent of infants born in the United States are multiethnic or multiracial, a number that was just 11 to 12 percent in 2000. But despite the fact that most of those children have a white parent, inadequacies in the census classifications mean that the great majority of them are identified as nonwhites. This is important, because most partly white individuals behave like whites in sociological terms. They grow up in neighborhoods with many whites, have white friends as adults, think of themselves mostly as white or partly white, and marry whites.

In addition, according to Alba, “when individuals report having Hispanic ancestry, the Census Bureau assumes, following the O.M.B. standards, that they are only Hispanic regardless of their answers to the race question.” In other words, Hispanics who describe themselves as white are classified as minorities, not as whites.

The census defines as Hispanic or Latino “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.” In the 2010 census, there were 50.48 million Hispanics, 53 percent of whom self-identified as white.

When Hispanics who identify themselves as white are added in, the white share of the population actually grew modestly between 2000 and 2017 from 75.1 percent to 76.6 percent.

This raises a question: If the census dropped the binary non-Hispanic white-minority division and instead stressed the large number of people of mixed ancestry who self-identify as white, would the anxieties of whites fearful of a majority-minority America be lessened?

A second question is how many Americans who are currently inclined to see immigrants as outsiders and as threats to the nation’s culture will perceive those coming from Asian, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern and North African nations as part of the American mainstream — even as more of those migrants intermarry. And what about the second-, third- and fourth-generation offspring of increasing numbers of Latino-white and Asian-white unions?

Trump has driven home not only to his base but to many others the message of a threatening majority-minority future.

[A] survey of 2,600 non-Hispanic whites conducted in July 2016, during the campaign, by Dowell Myers and Morris Levy, political scientists at the University of Southern California.

They asked one half of the respondents to read a story about the “conventional narrative about the decline of non-Hispanic whites” and the other half to read a story detailing “the growth of Hispanic and Asian-American populations” but that “also mentioned the rise of intermarriage and reported the Census Bureau’s alternative projection of a more diverse white majority persisting the rest of the century.”

Of those who read the first version, “46 percent of white Democrats and a whopping 74 percent of Republicans expressed anger or anxiety when reading about the impending white-minority status.” Of those who read the second version, “only 35 percent of white Democrats and 29 percent of white Republicans expressed anger or anxiousness.”

Justin Gest, a professor of public policy at George Mason University and the author of the book “The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality,” is far less optimistic. He wrote by email:

The image of these immigrants has been contaminated by Trumpian portrayals of criminals, benefit hunters, and opportunistic job competitors. Further, the vision of a more hybridized whiteness is still a couple decades away, and political minds are notoriously myopic.

It is not, Gest argued, a strategy to reassure white Trump supporters, “Don’t worry. Those immigrants will soon be white too.” There is a pervasive perception that Latinos, Africans and Asians are simply too different, too far removed from what Sam Huntington called the “American creed.”

Lilliana Mason, a political scientist at the University of Maryland, shares Gest’s pessimistic assessment. As a general rule of thumb, Mason argued, “people don’t respond well to being told that they’ll think differently one day. It comes across as patronizing and can cause them to stick to their original idea even more strongly.”

Bart Bonikowski, a professor of sociology at Harvard, argues that in the contemporary political climate, the fear of cultural disruption has become so pervasive on the right that realistic facts and figures make little difference. As he wrote in an email:

My sense is that actual levels of migration, shifts in immigrants’ ethnic identification, and changing rates of intermarriage are, at best, only loosely coupled with perceptions of cultural threat among white voters, particularly those with moderate levels of education and those living outside of urban centers. Even though actual levels of undocumented migration from Mexico — and net migration from that country in general — have decreased in recent years, this in no way diminished the potency of Donald Trump’s xenophobic discourse in the 2016 presidential election.

Bonikowski elaborated:

The reason for this is that many Trump supporters have long held strong ethnonationalist sentiments, but these sentiments have only recently become politically salient, as Trump, and other Republicans before him, have actively stoked fears of demographic and cultural change and channeled them into powerful resentments toward minority groups. For many voters, such resentments are not rooted in everyday experience, not least because they tend to live in ethnically homogeneous, predominantly white communities, but rather, they are shaped by powerful nativist narratives perpetuated by right-wing politicians, partisan organizations, and media outlets.

Could a more multifaceted narrative than the binary white vs. minority projection into the future lessen the anxiety of some whites? Michael Barber, a political scientist at Brigham Young, doubts it:

Their research shows, Barber writes, that partisans have extremely biased perceptions of the “other” party, including survey data showing that people “think that 32 percent of Democrats are LGBT (vs. 6 percent in reality) and 38 percent of Republicans earn over $250,000 per year (vs. 2 percent in reality).” With this in mind, Barber argued, “it isn’t a stretch to imagine that people think we’re already a majority-minority country when in fact we aren’t at all.”

“[A]s long as prominent leaders continue to mobilize white fear and anger on the issue, citizens who trust them will follow.”

Robert Jones, the C.E.O. of the Public Religion Research Institute, put the problem this way in an email:

Throughout American history in particular, the question of whiteness has been at the center of these debates, fueled by the fact that social privileges and political rights were tied to whiteness.

Historically, this has played out in the practices of the Census Bureau and the Citizenship and Immigration Services that “recorded race and ethnicity categories over time, e.g., ‘Celt’ and ‘Hebrew’ once appeared outside of the ‘Caucasian’ category.”

Sadly, Trump (and Pence who plays the same game) and the GOP have played upon what my late southern belle grandmother called the "white trash mentality" - only their skin color gave them more standing than blacks and other racial minorities.  The irony is that most educated whites likely have far more in common with educated and effluent minorities than the do with poor, uneducated religiously extreme whites who, in my view, are the biggest threat to America.