[The Felon]
President Trumpappears content, for now, to leave the Iran war in an indefinite holding pattern. By avoiding both military strikes and peace talks, he hopes to allow time for the naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz and extensive U.S. sanctions to squeeze the regime into submission. Trump believes he can afford to wait because Washington holds all the leverage.Tehran has a mirror-image view. The regime believes that it holds the leverage, especially after dissatisfaction with the war and sky-high gas prices led to a rout of Republicans in the midterm elections. Iran, like the Trump administration, believes that its position will grow stronger over time. Its leaders are prepared to maintain the status quo, driving up the costs of the war for the United States and its allies by launching periodic drone attacks and cyberattacks. Last week, the head of the Supreme National Security Council said Iran would not allow the removal of “even a single particle of enriched nuclear material,” a position hardly designed to coax the Trump administration into negotiations.
The upshot of both parties playing the waiting game is that the conflict appears to have stabilized. But that’s misleading. The greatest danger now is a dramatic escalation through a miscalculation, an accident, or a rash attempt by either side to capitalize on what it considers its advantage. Beneath the apparent calm, the standoff remains deeply unstable. Trump’s Iran-war plans are in limbo because limbo is better than the other options. But that limbo can’t last forever.
In the weeks before the midterms, Trump privately told people that he favored another round of military strikes so severe that Iran would have no choice but to reopen negotiations. But this time, they would be on Washington’s terms, finally granting Trump the victory he has long claimed to have already won. Trump appears to have cooled on the idea in recent days.
There is also a resigned sense in the West Wing that Trump’s leverage over Iran has diminished, however much he tries to pretend otherwise. Tehran can follow the news. The Democrats’ sweep was a sharp rebuke to the president. Some in the White House fear that hard-liners in Iran will interpret the result just as many pundits in the U.S. did: as evidence that the American public has little appetite for a prolonged conflict and that Trump will eventually be forced to cut his losses.
The Republican Thomas Massie’s unsuccessful bid to impeach Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, which was driven in part by Hegseth’s handling of the Iran war, reinforced the political risks that Trump could face were he to resume a full-scale conflict. Hence the focus on squeezing Tehran economically as the least unpalatable option.
But how much longer can the administration afford to wait? The massive military deployment is costly, strains personnel and equipment, and ties up assets that could be deployed elsewhere. About 17 U.S. Navy warships are in the Middle East, including three aircraft-carrier groups, the third having recently arrived from Asia. . . . . The naval blockade has operated, off and on, since April. But shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below normal levels. The U.S. recently launched a separate operation, dubbed Task Force Iron Gate, to disrupt the trading of weapons, dual-use technologies, and other sanctioned materials through overland routes. But interdiction is extremely difficult.
Trump also runs the risk of the limbo becoming, in the eyes of many inside and outside his own party, the sort of “forever war” that he promised never to start. . . . But his early predictions of a conflict lasting a few weeks already look naive as the war approaches its tenth month. Although the economic campaign is working in many ways, Iran’s regime has shown little regard for the well-being of its people and a surprising ability to absorb U.S. pressure. Indeed, Tehran could view ongoing conflict as a helpful tool to keep its citizens’ attention focused on outside threats, rather than the regime’s own economic and political weaknesses.
Iran’s neighbors, meanwhile, have been discouraging Washington from resuming attacks because they fear becoming targets of Iranian retaliation. Trump, for now, seems to be heeding the message without signaling to Tehran that he is backing down.
Even if Trump changes his mind—as he has repeatedly—and resumes the full-bore conflict, renewed hostilities would not necessarily achieve a decisive blow. And at least one of the options Trump gave during a July press conference—striking water-treatment plants as part of a broadside on Iranian infrastructure—could amount to a war crime under international law. Democrats, with their new, large majorities in both chambers on Capitol Hill, could add any targeting of water-treatment plants to the list of Iran-war issues they want to investigate come January.
In December 2011, Eric Schmidt, then a top executive at Google, issued an ominous warning about Iran’s cyber capabilities. . . . Those might just be a foretaste of what Tehran would unleash were the U.S. to restart military operations. Iran also retains the ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz with mines and drones, to threaten U.S. forces and regional allies, and to disrupt U.S. operations worldwide. Last month, a dozen B-1 bombers were relocated from a U.K. base used by the U.S. in England after threats from a group linked to Iran.
As the U.S. and Iran posture, pressure, and harass each other, oil prices remain elevated; Brent crude is just under $100 a barrel. “It will be very hard to get back to $70 a barrel, where it was at the start of the war,” Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence officer who specializes in Iran, told us.
For now, all parties seem tolerant of that awkward status quo, given the unappealing alternatives. But because of the U.S. blockade’s mounting costs, “this scenario is too unstable, too dangerous, and too costly to go in perpetuity,” Trita Parsi, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a think tank, told us. Something has to give.
The gap between the two sides’ demands remains enormous. Washington wants an agreement that effectively dismantles Iran’s nuclear program and restores the Strait of Hormuz to a free and open waterway. Tehran wants an agreement that recognizes its effective control of the strait, lifts the sanctions, and guarantees that the United States will not attack again.
For now, Iran and the Trump administration have found ways to avoid making difficult decisions that might lead to a clear outcome. Instead, both are betting that time is on their side. But that may be the most dangerous assumption of all.

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