Sunday, November 15, 2026

The Pentagon Ignored Warnings About Iran’s Drones

The war with Iran continues with no resolution in sight. While oil prices are down, that could literally change overnight if Iran tightens control of the Strait of Hormuz or steps up attacks on tankers trying to exit the Persian Gulf through the strait.  Add to the mix Iran's large supply of drones - a few reports suggest a drone strike against the Felon has been a possible Iranian option - and the large destruction to the USA's bases in the Middle East a state of war continues of whatever lies the Felon and his incompetent Secretary of Defense may claim. As a very long piece in The Atlantic lays out, one of the U.S.'s biggest vulnerabilities is the inability to stop Iranian drones and the Pentagon - think the Felon and Hegseth - has refused to learn from lessons learned by Ukraine in its war with Russia, particularly interceptors that can take down Russian drone which are based on Iranian drones. This refusal stems from the arrogance and hubris of the Felon and Hegseth who appear dead set on repeating the mistakes of past military leaders that refused to recognize changes in weaponry and the attack methods - e.g., the attack on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the British capital ships, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, at the out set of WWII using Japanese air power ushered out battleships as navies' principal capital ships and saw them replaced by aircraft carrier battle groups.  In both the war in Iran and the war in Ukraine weaponry and tactics are changing rapidly while our incompetent senior leadership seemingly refuse to learn from others. Here are article highlights:

From a distance, the Iranian drone resembled an arrowhead, pointing downward as it dove out of the sky. Its propeller, powered by the kind of motor typically used in dirt bikes and lawnmowers, produced a high-pitched wail. It struck midmorning on March 1, the second day of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, hitting a logistics center in Kuwait used by the American military. Dozens of personnel from the Army Reserve were working at an office building there.

The incoming drone, a variant of the Shahed, slammed through the roof of the building and detonated its payload. Six American service members were killed and more than two dozen wounded, several of them critically—the deadliest attack on U.S. troops in the war.

In Ukraine, which has faced years of attacks from this type of drone, people often compare its sound as it falls out of the sky to a Vespa revving its engine. But the noise no longer terrifies Ukrainians the way it once did. Last year, Ukraine’s arms industry developed a cheap and effective way to shoot down Shaheds. The U.S. military knew about this technology months before the war in Iran began. A group of senior American officers, worried about exactly the type of attack that killed those six soldiers in Kuwait, told me they repeatedly urged commanders in the Middle East to deploy the new Ukrainian technology.

The Pentagon ignored their warnings, which included detailed reports sent up the chain of command. Several of the officers who tried to raise the alarm about Iranian Shaheds have since been fired or forced into early retirement.

In a statement, the Pentagon disputed the officers’ account and said it was “disgusting” for the Atlantic to suggest that the U.S. military was “somehow unprepared” for the start of the war in Iran. “Central Command established the most extensive air defense umbrella in the world over the Middle East,” Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell wrote in the statement.

The warnings were based on Ukraine’s experience with Russia, which acquired Shahed drones from Iran in 2022. Waves of them have pounded Ukrainian cities ever since, often in swarms of a few hundred per night. Last summer, the armed forces of Ukraine deployed a new type of interceptor to destroy Shaheds in midair. U.S. Army officers stationed in Germany began training on these interceptors that fall, and they asked their Ukrainian allies to produce a report about their new invention.

The document, dated December 2025 . . . . described in detail how Ukraine had developed these defensive weapons. A drawing of an interceptor appeared on the cover of the report, alongside a Shahed with a bull’s-eye on its belly. It was shared inside the military and with some U.S. allies in December, roughly two months before the war in Iran started.

The Army’s European Command, led at the time by General Chris “C.D.” Donahue, had by then deployed the new interceptors at bases in Europe, including in Romania and Poland. Donahue and his team in Wiesbaden, Germany, urged their fellow officers to do the same at bases in other regions, especially in the Middle East, where the threat from Iranian drones seemed most obvious to them.

The officers in Wiesbaden sent the document up to their commanders, and they pressed the leadership in Washington to act on it. Had their warnings been heeded, they believe the lives of U.S. soldiers could have been saved.

At the start of this year, the team of officers in Wiesbaden compiled a second report about the Ukrainian interceptors. To ensure the widest possible distribution, the military cleared it for public release in February. The document, roughly 12 pages long, described how European Command had fielded the Ukrainian interceptors at some of its bases. It offered detailed guidance for commanders in other regions to do the same.

No one involved in preparing the two reports knew the timing of the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, which was then widely reported to be in the works. But they understood that any Iranian response would almost certainly involve Shahed drones, which the regime had invented, mass produced, and stockpiled. The second report was published on February 23, too late, as it turned out, for its warnings to make much difference. The war in Iran would start only five days later.

This account of the Pentagon’s failure to defend against these weapons is based on interviews with more than a dozen current and former military officers from the U.S. and Ukraine, who were involved in the effort to warn about the danger of Iranian drones and arm U.S. forces with the most effective countermeasures. Most of them spoke on condition of anonymity, because they fear reprisals from their commanders and officials at the Pentagon. . . . He [Hegseth] has also ordered the military to cut 20 percent of the positions reserved for generals and admirals across the armed forces.

Donahue fell victim to that purge this summer. In the final months of his Army career, he worked with the team in Wiesbaden to send hundreds of Ukrainian interceptors to the Middle East, hoping they could defend against another deadly strike on U.S. forces. Hegseth did not support these efforts, the officers involved told me. “The technology is so effective. It’s so cheap,” one of them said. But the top officials in Washington did not want to accept it: “Because of arrogance, they said, Why do we need it?”

[N]ow, nearly five years after Russia invaded, most U.S. military officers would agree that Ukraine offers important lessons on the future of warfare. Its innovations in drone technology have been forged in the deadliest conflict Europe has seen in 80 years. Few American generals recognized their value sooner than Christopher Cavoli, who served until last year as the supreme allied commander of NATO. Roughly a year into the war, he hosted a training exercise with Ukrainian soldiers, and he was stunned by how quickly one of them, a private, figured out how to use a U.S.-military radar system. . . . By the second summer of the war, in 2023, the Ukrainians began to innovate in earnest, especially when it came to drone warfare. “That’s when we realized, Oh, these guys are doing stuff that we don’t do. Let’s go look at it seriously.”

About two years later, in the spring of 2025, NATO invited a team of drone operators from Ukraine to act as the enemy side—the red team—in a round of war games in Estonia. The blue team “took a whipping,” one of the American participants told me. The Ukrainians launched about 30 drone strikes in rapid succession, taking 17 armored vehicles and two NATO battalions out of the game before dinner. The U.S. troops were so unaccustomed to the red team’s tactics that some of them looked up at an incoming drone and waved their arms at its camera. One of the organizers of the drills later used that footage in a presentation to show how much the U.S. military had to learn.

The Ukrainians also went home with a lesson. One of their commanders told me that the NATO troops, maneuvering around in their armored vehicles, had resembled a “golden-armored knight” who showed up for a gunfight with a fancy sword. “They are unable to accept reality,” he said. Drones now account for the great majority of casualties in the war. Ukraine’s military industry produced 4 million of them last year, far outpacing all NATO countries combined.

At first, Ukrainian soldiers tried to shoot them down with machine guns, using spotlights to scan the sky. Whenever possible, they also relied on advanced air-defense systems, such as the Patriot missile, which the U.S. and its allies provided to Ukraine in small batches. Patriots cost several million dollars per shot, and Ukraine needed to conserve them for bigger threats, such as Russian ballistic missiles. It could not afford to use them against drones that cost Russia roughly $35,000 each.

For the engineers at Skyfall, the challenge came down to velocity. None of its drones could fly fast enough to catch Shaheds and ram them from behind. . . . . Within a few months, several Ukrainian companies, including Skyfall, cracked the problem, developing a range of interceptors to take down Shaheds.

To detect the interceptors’ targets, Ukraine also set up a network of acoustic sensors that listened for the noise of incoming Shaheds. The sensors did not require much engineering. Some were just smartphones affixed to long poles. When their mics picked up the sound of a Shahed, Ukraine’s air-defense forces sent up an interceptor to knock it down. The Ukrainian military purchased and deployed thousands of them last year. Before long, the interceptors had all but neutralized the threat, downing Shaheds at a rate of more than 90 percent, according to official estimates.

Last fall and winter, Skyfall gave frequent tours of its interceptor factory to Western officials. Some of the first visitors came from a command within the U.S. Army called Security Assistance Group Ukraine, or SAG-U. Headquartered in Wiesbaden . . . The goals of such visits, apart from facilitating the delivery of U.S. weapons and intelligence, centered on the need for the U.S. military to draw lessons from Ukraine. Donahue would often tell his team that if they failed to study this war, “we would pay the price in blood and treasure.” Their hosts took the Americans to see Ukraine’s most innovative factories, drone units, and command posts.

Some inside the U.S. military, however, still saw it as prudent to prepare for Iran to escalate. Apart from its missile arsenal, Tehran had an enormous stockpile of Shaheds, many of them hidden underground beyond the reach of U.S. air strikes. They were cheap and plentiful enough for Iran to overwhelm the U.S. supply of Patriots and other sophisticated air defenses. Their range of potential targets included every U.S. base in the Middle East, and they could threaten any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz, the aorta of the global oil supply.

None of the officers in Wiesbaden ever received a clear explanation of why the Trump administration ignored this advice. But the officers sensed two reasons behind the resistance in Washington: arrogance and politics. . . . At the Pentagon, “Hegseth did not want to hear the word Ukraine,” a senior Ukrainian official told me of that period.

U.S. Army officers in Europe sensed a similar toxicity. If you brought up Ukraine at the Pentagon, “if you were lucky, you were met with a sneer,” one of them told me. Under the Biden administration, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin received weekly updates from SAG-U about the war. Once Hegseth took over, those briefings stopped. So did nearly all U.S. military aid to Ukraine.

Around that time, Zelensky and Trump began negotiating a deal for the U.S. to purchase Ukraine’s most advanced military equipment. . . . . But after a few rounds of talks, the U.S. shelved the deal last fall. That decision came down to American hubris, one of the Ukrainian officials involved in the negotiations told me at the time. The message from the White House amounted to this, he said: “Know your place. We have the greatest military in the world. We don’t need anything from you.”

The previous week, U.S. and Israeli air strikes managed to kill much of Iran’s leadership. But Iran’s arsenal of missiles and drones allowed it to stay in the fight far longer than Trump expected. Its response featured a barrage of Shahed drones, by some estimates more than 2,000, aimed at targets across the Middle East: military bases, airports, and logistics hubs used by the Americans, as well as civilian targets and infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and elsewhere in the region.

In trying to shoot down the drones, the U.S. and its allies quickly burned through most of their supply of Patriot missiles. In some cases, such as with the Shahed strike on the base in Kuwait, U.S. air defenses failed—with deadly consequences.

One of the survivors of that strike, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Halbur, recalled waking up in the wreckage of his office, his uniform covered in blood, and the bones of his right elbow falling away. One of his comrades, Major Stephen Ramsbottom, later told the Associated Press that the base should have been better defended. “This type of fight has been going on for five years in Ukraine, and our excuse is we didn’t expect it to happen to us,” he said. “That’s preposterous in my mind.”

On the sixth day of the war, Zelensky announced that Ukraine would send equipment and experts to the Middle East to help the U.S. counter Iranian drones. Trump seemed open to the arrangement. In an interview with Reuters, he declared the same day that he would accept “any assistance from any country.” But his position flipped a week later. “No, we don’t need their help in drone defense,” Trump said on Fox News Radio on March 13. “We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.”

In the Middle East, Iran has already used this weapon against U.S. forces, which have relied on Patriot missiles, fighter jets, and other sophisticated hardware to shoot them down. Ukraine appears close to a much more efficient solution. But the U.S. has no deal to buy this new generation of interceptors. For the officers in Wiesbaden, it looked like a sign that the Pentagon could make the same mistake twice: ignoring the latest innovations and, in the process, putting the lives of its troops in danger.

Eight months after the deadly strike in Kuwait, the U.S military has still not deployed the sort of network of sensors and interceptors Ukraine uses against Shaheds. According to the latest estimates, the U.S. has used up nearly three-quarters of its Patriot missiles since the start of the war in Iran. Replenishing that stockpile will take years. In the meantime, U.S. soldiers in the Middle East are staying close to their air-raid shelters, keeping their ears pricked for the whine of inbound drones.

The incompetence and hubris at the top starting with the orange Jabba the Hut is both stunning and a danger to our troops.

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