The Felon's Biggest Error in the Iran War

Over the years, the Felon has shown himself to be a bully both in his business interests and now in the foreign policy pushed by his regime.  He has also displayed an attitude that he believes he knows more than anyone else and is hostile towards experts and career diplomats and intelligence personnel who are not willing to rubber stamp whatever he wants to do no matter how flawed.  All of this has been showcased by his treatment of long time allies and NATO members in particular , including his relentless obsession with seizing Greenland. Indeed, this mindset of bullying and ignoring the motivations of allies and foes alike is writ large in the Felon's war of choice against Iran that he now finds himself unable to exit without having to admit defeat. All of the current debacle, including rising gasoline prices in America, could have been avoided had the Felon but listened to warnings of how a war with Iran could go sideways and how Iran could use the Strait of Hormuz to disturb the global economy and use oil as an economic weapon.  Instead, the Felon's hubris and quest for a "legacy" won out and America now finds itself in a mess solely of the Felon's creation.  A piece at The Atlantic looks at the Felon's unforced error. Here are excerpts:

For 2,500 years, military commanders have heeded the injunction of Sun Tzu, the great Chinese military strategist: Know your enemy. Yet the Trump administration’s greatest mistake in the Iran war may be its persistent failure to understand Tehran’s priorities and motivations—and how much punishment the regime is willing to absorb to prevail.

Iran’s decision Tuesday to launch ballistic missiles at U.S. troops in Jordan was a prime example. It befuddled Washington. U.S. officials had come to expect that their actions would drive the war, and Iran would react. But here was Tehran, escalating matters just after the United States had suspended its 13-day barrage of strikes against Iranian defenses and infrastructure. U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, described the move as a “surprise attack.”

Tehran characterized the missile strikes as self-defense against what the regime saw as the Trump administration’s broadening of the war. Around the same time as the Iranian attack, U.S. and Saudi forces launched joint strikes on Iran-backed militias in Iraq, Riyadh’s first publicly acknowledged military strikes of the conflict.

This week’s events hardly represented the first time that the two sides had misread each other’s intentions. The convoluted and complicated war has swung almost weekly between peace overtures and fighting. Those misinterpretations appear set to continue, especially amid signs that others may be dragged into the fight.

The memorandum of understanding that Washington and Tehran signed in the middle of last month quickly devolved into one of the war’s signature misunderstandings. The very first clause of the agreement promised to end the fighting, but the two sides had fundamentally different interpretations of their obligations.

The memorandum did not end the dispute over the Strait of Hormuz but rather, it papered over it. Washington believed it had secured 60 days of open, toll-free commercial navigation. Tehran read the agreement as preserving its authority to manage traffic through the waterway. As the dispute erupted, some Iranian officials believed that the U.S. had purposely drafted a vague agreement to trigger a violation that could be used as a predicate to resume strikes . . . . Was anyone really surprised that the pact fell apart? Certainly not President Trump, who professed that he “couldn’t care less” after each side had walked away.

Even before the war began, in late February, the two governments were talking past each other. The U.S. believed that Iran was fragile and the regime susceptible to collapse after nationwide protests. The regime believed that nothing short of its total capitulation to U.S. demands would prevent a war. Trump ordered the war to begin while talks were still under way, and his administration believed that the death of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the conflict’s first day would quickly be followed by the collapse of the state. Instead, five months in, the regime remains intact and seems to have enough confidence to endure any U.S. response.

“America’s calculation is that escalation would lead to surrender. Iran’s calculation is that escalation would lead to deterrence,” Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, told us. . . . But neither side seems able to answer the question that matters most: What if escalation doesn’t work?

Part of the confusion may stem from the fact that Trump himself appears to be of (at least) two minds about how he wants to proceed. He has vacillated between backing more military action and giving peace talks a chance. The U.S. cannot begin to understand its enemy if it has yet to settle on its own aims—or how to achieve them.

The U.S. is seeking to understand an enemy that is changing and adapting. Iran appears intent on reintroducing the element of military surprise, driven by the belief that it can outlast Trump and that negotiations no longer present a viable path. The regime operates differently under its new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, who replaced his late father. Iran is no longer content to let proxies across the region fight for its interests. It wants to use its missiles and drones to fight for its long-term security. And it is willing to endure strikes by the U.S. to the point that American military commanders are running short on viable targets it can hit to stop attacks on the strait.

“They are willing to sacrifice themselves and the public for the future of the regime,” Citrinowicz said. He doesn’t believe that Iran wants to fight an endless war any more than Trump does. But Tehran thinks Trump faces constraints, including the economic damage stemming from the strait’s continued closure and the tepid response of Gulf States. Iran’s position, in contrast, has been strengthened by support from the Houthis in Yemen, who recently began targeting Saudi interests and threatened to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait to commercial shipping. Iranian leaders, Citrinowicz said, “believe at the end of the day, they are able to shape the situation on the ground to their own benefit.”

A number of influential MAGA allies—including Laura Ingraham and Steve Bannon—have publicly and privately called for the White House to rapidly wind down the war, believing that the conflict has demoralized Trump’s base and will hurt the GOP in the midterms. . . . . Yet at same time, Persian Gulf allies have made clear that they find Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz untenable—especially if the regime charges tolls. That would, in effect, mean that the same countries battered by Tehran’s missiles would be stuck paying for Iran to rebuild.

For now, there are no good options for Trump and there is no clarity as to how two sides in a widening war can find off-ramps, particularly if they continue to misinterpret each other’s actions.

Trump could declare victory, noting that the U.S. and Israel killed the ayatollah, and vow to attack again should Iran resume its quest for a nuclear weapon. Or he could try to return to the terms of the MOU. But the administration would likely have to sign on to some aspects of Iran’s interpretation of it, such as its retention of control of the Strait of Hormuz. Or Trump can escalate, hitting Iran’s missile capabilities to make the targeting of U.S. bases and Gulf partners more difficult. But he would have to do so at a rate faster than Iran can reconstitute its forces. And he faces political opposition to a more prolonged conflict: . . . . More than two-thirds of respondents said the Trump administration should end the war now.

Both sides seem to agree on one thing: There is no end in sight to the war. U.S. defense officials told us that they believe conflict will continue into 2027. Iran is signaling that it plans for a fight even longer than that.

A self-made disaster.  The New York Times is reporting as follows:

To America’s allies, President Trump’s war in Iran, now in its sixth month, seems headed for a strategic defeat. They worry that the inability of the United States to turn military superiority into a sustainably changed Iran has displayed a vulnerability that Russia and China will welcome. In addition, Mr. Trump’s goals remain unmet, and the U.S. military is running short on key armaments that it needs for global reach.