The Continuing Fool's Errand in Afghanistan

True to form, the military leadership struts and blathers about success in Afghanistan. The true facts on the ground demonstrate that such pronouncements are overly optimistic or perhaps even down right false - particularly when Afghanistan's corrupt president says he'd pick the Taliban if he had to pick between the Taliban, the USA and the international coalition forces. But our generals - an most in the GOP - have never seen a war that they don't love and in which they won't try to claim they're winning no matter the objective facts. George Will has a column in the Washington Post that ponders whether or not the Taliban may be about to pull off an equivalent of the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam which will underscore the madness of continuing the debacle of squandered treasure and needlessly lost American lives. American hubris continues to make the military leadership believe they can do what no one has done before, including the Soviets and their 10 year nightmare which helped set the stage for the fall of the Soviet government. Here are highlights from Will's column:
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Once when the French statesman Duc de Richelieu (1766-1822) was planning a military campaign, an officer placed a finger on a map, saying: "We shall cross the river at this point." Richelieu replied: "Excellent, sir, but your finger is not a bridge."
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The difference between planning and accomplishing in war is on many minds as the Obama administration reviews progress, such as it has been, in Afghanistan in the 54 weeks since the president simultaneously announced the surge and a July 2011 beginning of "the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan."
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Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, was recently asked (on ABC's "This Week") to assess progress there. He responded with minimalist optimism: There has been "localized improvement" in "certain areas."
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[T]he fundamental questions are: Can Afghan security forces become competent while the Afghan government remains riddled with, indeed defined by, corruption? If they cannot, can America successfully combat corruption and the Taliban, simultaneously?
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The Taliban is culturally primitive, so any sign of tactical sophistication is unsettling. Although it is unlikely that the Taliban leadership has as nuanced an understanding of the importance and dynamics of American public opinion in wartime as North Vietnam's leadership did, Taliban leaders surely know that North Vietnam won the Vietnam War not in Vietnam but in America.
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Might the Taliban's tactics, techniques and procedures (in military argot, TTP) make possible a spike in violence in some way comparable to Tet in its impact on American opinion?
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Twenty-three months from now, Obama will have been reelected, or not. The outcome depends partly on whether the party's left, which provides a disproportionate portion of the party's energy, is energized. On Election Day 2012, what already is America's longest war will be in its 12th year.
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Whatever one thinks of the current strategy in this war, Obama is prosecuting it with a vigor that indicates a refusal to allow political calculations to condition national security policy. This presidential virtue could imperil his presidency.