One of the phenomena that drives me to distraction about to many Americans is the misplaced respect, deference and outright fawning given to senior military commanders. Such respect and deference is as misplaced as that given to senior members of the Catholic Church hierarchy - those same men who conspired on a world wide basis to cover up sexual abuse by priests and other clergy. And in the case of the military leadership, this misplaced idol worship dovetails with the maddening myth of American exceptionalism. While the American media is focused on the illicit affair between David Petraeus, they are blind to his disastrous leadership in Afghanistan. A nation from which we should have exited years ago, especially once Barack Obama was sworn in as commander-in-chief. Thankfully, some in the foreign press are focusing on Patraeus' failures beyond his failure to honor his marital vows. The Guardian has coverage on this overlooked scandal. Here are highlights:
More than three years ago, I sat in an overflow room in Washington, DC's Willard Hotel listening to General David Petraeus explain (pdf) how the only solution for the failing war in Afghanistan was a "comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy", modeled after the one that had allegedly achieved so much success in Iraq.
Petraeus's speech came at the annual meeting of the Center for New American Security, a DC-based thinktank that had become a locus of COIN thinking in DC. And Petraeus was at the peak of his power and acclaim – heralded by both Democrats and Republicans as the man responsible for saving the Iraq war.
With last week's revelations that Petraeus was having an affair as director of the CIA with his biographer Paula Broadwell, this tawdry story is likely to become the most glaring black mark on Petraeus's career. But while his behavior was reckless, arrogant and, frankly, just plain stupid, it's ironic that Petraeus is likely to be remembered more for that one personal act rather than his most grave professional mistake – namely, that same counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan for which he was one of Washington's most influential proponents.
The event at CNAS was the quintessential example of the blinders and hubris that were so pervasive among COIN boosters and, in particular, Petraeus. They were convinced that the surge in Iraq and the use of counterinsurgency tactics there had turned the tide. But as we know now – and should have even been aware then – the reality was far more complicated.
What's more, those who pushed the Iraq surge narrative suggested that a more humane and civilian-focused approach there had brought success. In reality, the number of civilians killed by US airstrikes had increased nearly four-fold in Iraq; the number of Iraqis in detention jumped 50%. This is not to suggest Petraeus deserves no credit; he smartly took advantage of these larger shifts in Iraqi society to seek an endgame to the conflict.
But the reality is that much of the decline in violence attributed to the actions of US forces was the result of decisions and actions taken by the Iraqis themselves. The US role was important, but hardly decisive.
In reality, the assumptions of COIN advocates were badly flawed and based on unrealistic views of what the US could accomplish. It failed to take account the key ways in which Afghanistan differed from Iraq: the resilience of and public support for the Taliban insurgency; the presence of safe havens across the border; the incompetence of the central government in Kabul; the delusion that US soldiers could be turned into miniature anthropologists with the wherewithal to have a full appreciation of Afghan cultural idiosyncrasies; and finally, an abject refusal to factor in the lack of political support in the United States for a drawn-out counterinsurgency campaign.
Worst of all, COIN advocates committed the cardinal sin of believing that a shift in military tactics or a new commander would be enough to win a military conflict in which the US was engaged. As the great Chinese war philosopher once wrote, "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat". That is a lesson that Petraeus, among others, simply forgot.
Petraeus was wrong – badly wrong. And more than 1,000 American soldiers, and countless more Afghan civilians, have paid the ultimate price for his over-confidence in the capabilities of US troops. And it wasn't as if Petraeus was an innocent bystander in these discussions: he was working a behind-the-scenes public relations effort – talking to reporters, appearing on news programs – to force the president's hand on approving a surge force for Afghanistan and the concurrent COIN strategy.
But when he took over as commander of the Afghanistan war in 2010, Petraeus adopted the harsh military strategy that he'd claimed the new, more civilian-focused COIN military plan would eschew. He ramped up airstrikes, which led to more civilian deaths. He increased the use of special forces operations. Perhaps worst of all, he sought to hinder the implementation of a political strategy for ending the war, seeking, instead, a clear military victory against the Taliban.
The greatest indictment of Petraeus's record is that, 18 months after announcing the surge, President Obama pulled the plug on a military campaign that had clearly failed to realize the ambitious goals of Petraeus and his merry team of COIN boosters. Today, the Afghanistan war is stalemated with little hope of resolution – either militarily or politically – any time soon.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were more than just bad strategy; they reflected poor military tactics and generalship. Self-interested and incomplete interpretations of what happened in Iraq led to predictably disastrous results in Afghanistan.
Perhaps we should spend a bit more time looking at that issue, rather who was sleeping with whom.
Yes, I am bitter and angry. I have a son-in-law in Afghanistan at this very moment. And his life is at risk because of pompous asses like Petraeus and their lies to the White House and Congress. The sad truth is that the military leadership will ALWAYS promise that with more men (and wasted lives), more money, and more time, they can prevail. In Afghanistan over 2000 years of history should have told Petraeus and those like him - let's not forget Chimperator Bush and Emperor Palpatine Cheney - that what he sought to do was a fool's errand from day one. And sadly, the myth of American exceptionalism allowed them to dupe the American public to believe initially what no one since Alexander the Great has been able to do in Afghanistan.
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